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INTRODUCTION
The doctrines of trademark genericism and functionality serve
similar functions under the Lanham Act and the common law of
unfair competition. Genericism, in the context of word marks, and
functionality, for trade dress, bar trademark registration under the
Lanham Act and, both under the Act and at common law, render a
trademark unprotectable and invalid. In the word mark context,
genericism stands for the proposition that certain parts of vocabulary cannot be cordoned off as trademarks; all competitors must be
able to use words that consumers understand to identify the goods
or services that they are selling.1 Functionality likewise demands
that certain aspects of product design cannot be legally protected as
trade dress, as to do so would potentially limit competitors’ ability
to make products that work as well at the same price. The core
concern, for both doctrines, is or should be the preservation of free
and fair market competition.
Part I of this Article explains the theoretical parallels between
the doctrines of genericism and functionality, and examines the
history and purpose of these doctrines. A finding that a word is or
has become generic, or that a form of trade dress is functional, negates a mark’s registration and protection under the Lanham Act,
as well as under state and common law. Even incontestable marks
can be declared invalid, regardless of the passage of time, under
either doctrine. The types of trademarks typically at issue when
making genericism and functionality determinations—word marks
that are, at best, descriptive, or product design functioning as trade
dress—are correctly described as weak. The genericism and functionality doctrines therefore play a critical role in marking the
boundaries of trademark law. To properly draw those lines, deci1

The focus of this definition is on the availability of the words to competitors, not the
public at large, because a different trademark doctrine aims to insulate all public, noncommercial uses of words (even those that are arbitrary or fanciful marks) from trademark
protection: fair use. See, e.g., KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc.,
543 U.S. 111, 121–23 (2004) (holding that, while descriptive fair use is not defeated by a
showing of likelihood of confusion, the degree of confusion may be pertinent to whether
defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s mark is fair); Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret
Stores Brand Mgmt. Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1041–43 (9th Cir. 2010) (defining and applying
descriptive fair use doctrine); Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171,
1175–83 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying test for nominative fair use).

694

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVII:691

sion makers need to correctly define and understand the theory
underlying both doctrines.
In Part II, this Article argues that both genericism and functionality, in their practical interpretation and purpose, should more
clearly reflect the core principle of protecting fair competition. In
particular, the concept of viable, competitive alternatives—either
in the form of words or alternative designs—should play an enhanced role in determining whether an erstwhile trademark is generic or functional. The various tests for genericism and functionality currently employed by the courts often attempt to draw formalistic distinctions among categories of words or product features that may confound business owners (and their lawyers) and
divert the focus of the courts’ inquiry in such cases away from the
core value at the heart of both doctrines: preserving fair competition.
I. THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE GENERICISM AND
FUNCTIONALITY DOCTRINES
As noted above, both trademark genericism and functionality
originated as doctrines under the common law and now act as bars
to registration and trademark protection under the Lanham Act.2
They share similar roots: As the common law of unfair competition
expanded to protect source identifiers outside the scope of a technical trademark (i.e., an inherently distinctive word mark), courts
developed concomitant limitations to curb the potential for overly
expansive protections that would hinder competition.3 Courts were
also concerned that protecting certain types of word marks and
trade dress under the auspices of trademark law could effectively
evade constitutionally mandated limits on the patent monopoly.4
The genericism and functionality doctrines reflect these developments and concerns. When Congress passed the Lanham Act in
1946, the doctrines took on additional significance, as the benefits
of federal registration expanded exponentially.5 Flexible common
2
3
4
5

See infra Sections I.A–I.B.
See infra notes 26–31, 69 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 27–28, 70 and accompanying text.
Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (amended 1988).
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law rules have been supplanted by more rigid tests for genericism
and functionality that have created uncertainty and confusion for
courts and litigants alike.
A. The Common-Law Roots and Modern Evolution of the Genericism
Doctrine
The trademark law prohibition on the protection of generic
words or phrases originated, like most aspects of trademark law, in
the common law of unfair competition.6 However, the judicial need
to draw a bright line between descriptive words or phrases and generic ones did not. Two main aspects of the Lanham Act of 1946
changed the scope and significance of genericism analysis: (1) the
Lanham Act allowed trademark registration and protection of descriptive, but not generic, words or terms that had acquired secondary meaning; and (2) it increased the value of federal trademark
registration by extending nationwide priority in a mark to the registrant.7 Both changes significantly increased the potential impact of
a finding that a putative trademark was, or had become, generic.
Even as the genericism doctrine has evolved to become a critical
aspect of trademark law, courts have struggled to formulate a
workable definition of the doctrine.
1. Common-Law Treatment of Generic and Descriptive
Words
Under the common law, particularly prior to the enactment of
the Lanham Act in 1946, most courts treated descriptive and generic terms in a similar fashion: neither was protectable as a technical
trademark,8 but both were entitled to protection against passing off,
if they had acquired distinctiveness (i.e., they had evolved in the
6

See Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1811–20 (2007) (examining and explaining the common-law roots
of the genericism and genericide doctrines).
7
See infra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
8
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 721 (AM. LAW INST. 1938) (“A designation
cannot be a trade-mark for goods if it is likely to be regarded by prospective purchasers as
a common name or generic name for such goods or as descriptive of them or of their
ingredients, quality, properties, functions or uses.”); see also id. § 715(c) (noting that a
trademark cannot be “a common or generic name for the goods or a picture of them . . . or
a designation descriptive of the goods or of their quality, ingredients, properties or
functions”).
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minds of consumers into source-identifying marks).9 Therefore, a
court’s determination that a word or term was generic versus descriptive, or descriptive versus generic, was not highly consequential. In fact, some early common-law sources classified descriptive
words as a subset of generic terms.10 If a business owner could
prove that either a descriptive or generic term had acquired distinctiveness, and therefore was acting as a source identifier, it would be
considered a “trade name” and hence protected against passing
off.11 If the word or term was inherently distinctive, it would be en9

Several courts have held that generic or descriptive names may be protected against
unfair competition if they have acquired secondary meaning. See, e.g., Bell v. Davidson,
597 P.2d 753, 755 (Okla. 1979); Staple Cotton Coop. Ass’n v. Fed. Staple Cotton Co-Op
Ass’n, 162 So.2d 867, 869–70 (Miss. 1964); Storm v. Canyon Amusement Corp., 79
N.W.2d 698, 700 (S.D. 1956); Golden Slipper Square Club v. Golden Slipper Rest. &
Catering, 88 A.2d 734, 736 (Pa. 1952); Farrell v. Mennen Co., 235 P.2d 128, 130 (Utah
1951); Bernstein v. Friedman, 160 P.2d 227, 229 (Wyo. 1945); Jenney Mfg. Co. v. Leader
Filling Stations Corp., 196 N.E. 852, 854 (Mass. 1935).
For examples of cases discussing secondary meaning, see Electric Supply Co. v. Hess,
245 P. 27, 28 (Wash. 1926), which notes that secondary meaning doctrine applies to
“common, descriptive [and] generic words,” and Saunders System Atlanta Co. v. Drive It
Yourself Co. of Georgia, 123 S.E. 132, 136 (Ga. 1924).
Other courts have held that neither generic nor descriptive terms are entitled to
trademark protection without a showing of secondary meaning. See, e.g., MacPhail v.
Stevens, 586 P.2d 1339, 1341 (Colo. App. 1978); Williamson v. Answer Phone of
Jacksonville, Inc., 118 So.2d 248, 251 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Better Bus. Bureau of
Kan. City Advert. Club, Inc. v. Chappell, 307 S.W.2d 510, 515 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957);
Hartzler v. Goshen Churn & Ladder Co., 104 N.E. 34, 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 1914).
For an example of a case finding that either generic or descriptive trade names may
be entited to protection upon a showing of secondary meaning, see Anti-Defamation
League of B’nai B’rith v. Arab Anti-Defamation League, 340 N.Y.S.2d 532, 534–44 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1972).
10
See Speaker v. Shaler Co., 87 F.2d 985, 987 (7th Cir. 1937) (noting that “descriptive
words” are “included within the broader category of generic terms”); JAMES LOVE
HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS, TRADENAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (4th
ed. 1924) (defining a “generic term” as any term that is “too general . . . in its meaning to
become the monopoly of an individual in application to merchandise,” including
geographical names, proper names, and descriptive words); see also Milton Handler &
Charles Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names—An Analysis and Synthesis: I, 30 COLUM.
L. REV. 168, 168–70 (1930) (explaining the technical differences between trademarks and
trade names).
11
See, e.g., Houston v. Berde, 2 N.W.2d 9, 10 (Minn. 1942) (noting when “generic
words are used in a trade-name,” their use will be restrained when such use causes
confusion or deception); Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis. v. Benson, 104 P.2d 650,
652 (Cal. 1940) (noting deceptive use of “generic, descriptive, personal, and geographic
names” that have acquired secondary meaning constitutes unfair competition).
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titled to protection as a technical trademark, regardless of whether
it had acquired distinctiveness. A mark is considered inherently
distinctive when its “intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular
source of a product.”12 To be considered inherently distinctive,
and thus qualify as a technical trademark, a mark had to be nondescriptive (i.e., fanciful or arbitrary).13
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the rights
invested in a technical trademark (as opposed to a trade name)
were broader and more absolute than typically thought.14 To prove
infringement, the trademark owner did not have to show “fraud,”
or a deliberate intent to deceive consumers, on the part of the defendant.15 Courts generally required evidence of fraud to prove the
tort of “passing off” based on the misuse of a trade name (a source
identifier that did not qualify as a technical trademark).16 Although
12

Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992).
Handler & Pickett, supra note 10, at 169.
14
See, e.g., In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879) (characterizing trademarks
as “a property right”); see also Kidd v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 617, 619 (1879) (“The right to
use the trade-mark is not limited to any place, city, or State, and, therefore, must be
deemed to extend everywhere.”); Apollo Bros. v. Perkins, 207 F. 530, 533 (3d Cir. 1913)
(observing that the law “only permits a monopoly in the use of a trade-mark when it has
become the absolute and exclusive property of the first user—good against the world”);
HOPKINS, supra note 10, § 4 (opining that trademark rights are “broader and by far . . .
more valuable” than rights to a trade name); Grafton Dulany Cushing, On Certain Cases
Analogous to Trade-Marks, 4 HARV. L. REV. 321, 322 (1891) (noting that “[a] trademark
has become an absolute right”); Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition:
A Critical History of Legal Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305, 317–19 (1979)
(characterizing early treatment of technical trademarks as conferring monopolistic
property rights); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The
Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 343–44 (1980)
(describing early treatment of trademarks as “absolute property”).
15
See Apollo Bros., 207 F. at 533 (“A technical trade-mark . . . is treated as property,
and an infringement thereof carries with it the presumption of fraud; but where no such
exclusive right to the use of such trade-mark exists, a technical trade-mark right is not
established, and fraud—unfair competition—in the use of the mark must be proved.”);
HOPKINS, supra note 10, § 22 (noting that “fraud is presumed from the wrongful use of a
trademark”); McClure, supra note 14, at 317 (observing that, in this era, a plaintiff in a
trademark infringement case “was not required to show actual confusion of purchasers or
a fraudulent intent by the defendant”).
16
See HOPKINS, supra note 10, § 22 (“While fraud is presumed from the wrongful use
of a trademark it must be proven, directly or by inference, in all cases of unfair
competition which do not involve a technical trademark.”); Cushing, supra note 14, at 332
(noting that in “cases analogous to trade-marks,” i.e., cases involving common law trade
names, “fraud is the gist of the action”); see also HOPKINS, supra note 10, § 61 (stating
13
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early cases required a showing of intentional passing off by the defendant to prove fraud, and thus liability for misuse of another’s
trade name, the law evolved to eliminate the intent requirement
and focus instead on likelihood of confusion on the part of consumers.17
The legal advantage of an inherently distinctive technical
trademark over a trade name (protectable only with a showing of
acquired distinctiveness) dissipated relatively quickly under the
common law.18 In an article considered groundbreaking at the time,
Columbia law professors Milton Handler and Charles Picket argued in 1930 that legal protection of trademarks and trade names
had merged, although the courts did not always recognize that they
had done so, with less absolute protection being granted to trademarks and greater protection being extended to trade names: both
were protected against uses that led to a likelihood of consumer
confusion.19 Handler and Picket were at the forefront of the Legal
Realism movement, as they argued that courts should discard formalistic labels in favor of a pragmatic approach to trademark law
that focused on the manner in which marks actually functioned in
the commercial marketplace.20 Handler and Pickett’s theory was
confirmed in the First Restatement of Torts, published in 1938,
which observed that “there are no important differences between
that use of “merely descriptive word” will not be restrained unless circumstances show
“fraud on the part of the user”); McClure, supra note 14, at 317 (observing that, during
this era, a plaintiff in an action for unfair competition or passing off would be required to
prove both “actual deception of purchasers and fraudulent intent by the defendant”).
17
See Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1813–14 (discussing this trend and citing cases);
see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 717 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1938) (noting that
fraud “is not essential to infringement of either a trade-mark or a trade name”).
18
See Church & Dwight Co. v. Russ, 99 F. 276, 278 (C.C.D. Ind. 1900) (“The
tendency of the courts at the present time seems to be to restrict the scope of the law
applicable to technical trade-marks, and to extend its scope in cases of unfair
competition.” (citations omitted)); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 717 cmt. a
(observing that “there are no important differences between the protection given to the
interest in trade-marks and that given to the interest in trade names”).
19
Handler & Pickett, supra note 10, at 200 (concluding that “the supposedly sharp line
of demarcation [between trademarks and trade names] is being obliterated”).
20
See Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward A Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76
TEX. L. REV. 267, 272 n.24 (1997) (characterizing Professor Milton Handler as a legal
realist); see also Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean
Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1237 (1931) (characterizing Handler as a realist in the field
of “trade-marks and advertising”).

2017]

TOWARD A MORE COHERENT DOCTRINE

699

the protection given to the interest in trade-marks and that given to
the interest in trade names.”21
One difference remained, however, between trade names and
technical trademarks: only trademarks could be registered under
federal law.22 Under the Trade-Mark Act of 1905, descriptive
terms could not be registered.23 The only exception was the socalled “ten-year clause,” which provided that any name that had
been “in actual and exclusive use as a trademark” for ten or more
years prior to the enactment of the statute could be registered, regardless of whether it qualified as a technical trademark.24 This distinction, however, was not of great practical importance, as the
benefits of registration under the 1905 Act were limited.25
Although the common law did treat generic and descriptive
terms similarly, the courts also recognized the potentially negative
competitive implications of restricting competitors’ use of generic
terms.26 The cases in which these issues arose typically involved
disputes regarding intellectual property rights in trademarks or
trade names attached to patents, after the patent’s expiration. In
this context, the genericism doctrine reflected the courts’ concern
that trademark law would effectively and illegitimately extend the
life of the patent monopoly. For example, in discussing the status
21

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 717 cmt. a.
Trademark Act of 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-84, § 5, 33 Stat. 724, 728 (repealed 1946)
(prohibiting registration of a trademark “which consists . . . merely in words or devices
which are descriptive of the goods with which they are used, or of the character or quality
of such goods, or merely a geographical name or term”).
23
See id.
24
Id.; Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids, 233 U.S. 461, 465–67 (1914) (interpreting the
ten-year clause); Barber-Colman Co. v. Overhead Door Corp., 65 F.2d 147, 150 (C.C.P.A.
1933) (holding that mark which has acquired secondary meaning, but is not a technical
trademark, cannot be registered under Trade-Mark Act of 1905 unless the ten-year clause
applies).
25
Registration of a mark under the 1905 Act served as prima facie evidence of mark
validity and ownership of the mark. See Sylvester J. Liddy, The Lanham Act—An Analysis,
86 TRADEMARK REP. 421, 422 (1996) (originally published in 37 TRADEMARK REP. 87
(1947)). However, mark registration did not confer nationwide priority in the mark; the
benefits of registration extended no farther than the geographical reach of the goodwill of
the mark. See infra note 34 and accompanying text. Moreover, the concept of mark
incontestability did not exist under the 1905 Act.
26
Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938); Singer Mfg. Co. v. June
Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896).
22
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of the word “Singer” denoting a particular brand of sewing machine, the U.S. Supreme Court observed that “along with the public ownership of the [formerly patented] device there must also
necessarily pass to the public the generic designation of the thing
which has arisen during the monopoly . . . .”27 To do otherwise, the
Court wrote, would “disregard the public dedication [of the formerly patented invention] and practically perpetuate indefinitely
an exclusive right.”28
However, these early cases did not divorce the concept of genericism from the secondary meaning doctrine, or acquired distinctiveness. In discussing the trademark status of “Shredded Wheat”
breakfast cereal, the Court applied the primary significance test to
determine whether the mark at issue was protectable:
[T]o establish a trade name in the term ‘shredded
wheat’ the plaintiff must show more than a subordinate meaning which applies to it. It must show that
the primary significance of the term in the minds of
the consuming public is not the product but the
producer. This it has not done.29
The Court found that, to the extent “shredded wheat” retained any source-identifying significance, it was as a “subordinate
meaning” of the term.30 Moreover, even as to terms classified as
“generic” under this definition, the Court recognized a duty on the
part of competitors to avoid passing off by using the generic term
“fairly”—i.e., in a way that “reasonably distinguishes its product
from that of the plaintiff.”31
27

Singer, 163 U.S. at 185; see also Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 118 (“Since during the life of the
patents ‘Shredded Wheat’ was the general designation of the patented product, there
passed to the public upon the expiration of the patent, not only the right to make the
article as it was made during the patent period, but also the right to apply thereto the
name by which it had become known.”).
28
Singer, 163 U.S. at 185–86.
29
Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 118 (emphasis added).
30
Id.
31
Id. at 120; see also Singer, 163 U.S. at 187 (reasoning that the “right to use the name
because of its generic signification” did not “imply a power to destroy any good will [sic]
which belonged to the original maker” or to “deceive and defraud the public by so using
the name as to delude them into believing that the machine made by one person was made
by another”).

2017]

TOWARD A MORE COHERENT DOCTRINE

701

2. Changes Wrought by the Lanham Act
The repeal of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905 and subsequent passage of the Lanham Act in 1946 changed two aspects of trademark
law with respect to the treatment of generic words or phrases. Both
changes heightened the significance of a judicial determination that
a word or term was generic. First, it created a distinction between
“merely descriptive” terms and “common descriptive” (i.e., generic) ones: the former became registrable, with a showing of acquired distinctiveness; the latter did not.32 Second, it greatly enhanced the significance of federal trademark registration by giving
the registrant nationwide priority in the mark;33 the extent of a registrant’s priority was no longer limited by the geographic reach of
his goodwill.34 Therefore, the judicial construction of a dividing
line between generic and descriptive terms became much more
critical and significant.
The current version of the Lanham Act extends no protection
to words or terms considered generic, even if the word or term was,
at one point, a registered, inherently distinctive trademark.35 The
Act codifies the doctrine of genericide by stating that, if a mark becomes “the generic name for the goods or services on or in connection with which it is used,” for any reason, it is considered abandoned and is no longer a valid trademark.36 A mark that is deemed
generic can never achieve “incontestable” status.37 If a valid mark
becomes generic, it can be canceled at any time, even if it would
32

Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, §§ 2(e), (f), 15(4), 60 Stat. 427, 429, 434 (1946)
(amended 1988).
33
Trade-Mark Act of 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-84, § 5, 33 Stat. 724, 726 (1905) (repealed
1946).
34
See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 100 (1918); cf. Dawn
Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 364, 365 (2d Cir. 1959) (noting that
if the plaintiff’s expansion of business into the defendant’s trading area is probable, and
concurrent use of the marks would give rise to a likelihood of confusion, then the plaintiff
may enjoin the defendant from using its mark in that retail area).
35
See generally Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C §§ 1051–1141n (2012).
36
§ 1127. The Act ties abandonment via genericide to the “course of conduct” of the
mark’s owner, “including acts of omission as well as commission,” implying that the
mark’s owner has a duty to police unauthorized uses of the mark to prevent it from
becoming generic. Id.
37
See § 1065(4) (providing that “no incontestable right shall be acquired in a mark
which is the generic name for the goods or services or a portion thereof, for which it is
registered”).
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otherwise be considered incontestable.38 If a defendant to an infringement lawsuit claims the plaintiff’s unregistered mark is generic, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that it is not.39
As noted above, descriptive terms are treated differently under
the Lanham Act. Descriptive terms may be registered with a showing of acquired distinctiveness.40 Moreover, an “incontestable”
mark is not subject to challenge on the grounds that it is descriptive
and lacks such acquired distinctiveness (and perhaps never had it
in the first place).41 Therefore, the dividing line between generic
and descriptive terms constitutes the de facto boundary of protectable word marks: words or terms found to lie on the generic side of
the fence cannot function as trademarks.
3. Judicial Attempts to Define Genericism as Codified in the
Lanham Act
The Lanham Act provides only one definition of the word “generic” in the context of the statutory section regarding mark cancellation: “The primary significance of the registered mark to the
relevant public rather than purchaser motivation shall be the test
for determining whether the registered mark has become the generic name of goods or services on or in connection with which it has

38

§ 1064(3) (providing that a mark may be cancelled “[a]t any time if the registered
mark becomes the generic name for the goods or services, or a portion thereof, for which
it is registered”); see also § 1115(b)(2) (providing that an incontestable mark may be
subject to the defense that it has been abandoned by the registrant).
39
Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publ’ns, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1146 (9th
Cir. 1999) (“If a supposedly valid mark is not federally registered . . . the plaintiff has the
burden of proving nongenericness once the defendant asserts genericness as a defense.”);
see also Blinded Veterans Ass’n v. Blinded Am. Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035, 1041
(D.C. Cir. 1989); A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 297 (3d Cir. 1986).
40
See § 1052. Although § 1052(e)(1) bars registration of marks that are “merely
descriptive” of the goods of the applicant, § 1052(f) nonetheless allows registration of
such marks if they have “become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce.”
Other marks that are registrable only with a showing of acquired distinctiveness, under
§ 1052(f), include “deceptively misdescriptive” marks (§ 1052(e)(1)), “primarily
geographically descriptive” marks (§ 1052(e)(2)), and marks that are “primarily merely a
surname” (§ 1052(e)(4)).
41
Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 196 (1985) (holding that
“[m]ere descriptiveness is not recognized by either [section] 15 or [section] 33(b) as a
basis for challenging an incontestable mark”).
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been used.”42 In doing so, the Act appears to have codified the
common-law “primary significance” test articulated by the Supreme Court in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.,43 albeit at least
facially only in cases involving the genericide of formerly registered, presumably valid marks.44 Courts have expanded beyond this
definition of “generic,” however, in attempting to delineate a
boundary between words or terms that are potentially subject to
trademark protections and those that are not.
Perhaps the most common judicial definition of a generic word
or term is borrowed from the world of science: “A ‘generic’ term
is one that refers, or has come to be understood as referring, to the
genus of which the particular product or service is a species. It cannot become a trademark under any circumstances.”45 A corollary
of the genus/species terminology is the “who are you/what are
you?” test.46 Under this analysis: “A mark answers the buyer’s
questions ‘Who are you?’ ‘Where do you come from?’ ‘Who
vouches for you?’ But the [generic] name of the product answers
the question ‘What are you?’”47 In practice, these tests have proven difficult to apply.48

42

15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2012).
305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938).
44
This section of the Act was adopted specifically to reject the Ninth Circuit’s
“purchaser motivation test” for genericism, as articulated in Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v.
General Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296, 305–06 (9th Cir. 1979). See Wayne F. Osoba,
Note, The Legislative Response to Anti-Monopoly: A Missed Opportunity to Clarify the
Genericness Doctrine, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 197, 209–11 (1985) (discussing legislative
response to the Anti-Monopoly decision and resulting amendment of the Lanham Act).
45
Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publ’ns, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th
Cir. 1999); see also Park ‘N Fly, 469 U.S. at 194; Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Med. Dental
Surgeries, Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1014 (9th Cir. 1979); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting
World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
46
See Filipino Yellow Pages, 198 F.3d at 1147.
47
Id. (quoting Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1993));
see also Soc’y of Fin. Exam’rs v. Nat’l Ass’n of Certified Fraud Exam’rs, 41 F.3d 223, 227
(5th Cir. 1995); CES Publ’g Corp. v. St. Regis Publ’ns, 531 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1975).
48
See, e.g., A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 296–97 (3d Cir. 1986)
(noting the recognized difficulties of distinguishing among suggestive, descriptive, and
generic terms); Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1826–30 (discussing difficulties arising
from courts’ attempts to distinguish between genus and species, or generic and
descriptive terms); Arthur J. Greenbaum, Jane C. Ginsburg & Steven M. Weinberg, A
Proposal for Evaluating Genericism After “Anti-Monopoly,” 73 TRADEMARK REP. 101, 109–
43
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The resultant uncertainty—particularly in terms of drawing
distinctions between generic and descriptive names—imposes
costs on consumers and competitors alike.49 As discussed above, a
descriptive name that has acquired secondary meaning is entitled
to the full protection of the Lanham Act, just like an inherently distinctive mark.50 However, it may take years of use and advertising
to create that secondary meaning—in other words, it is expensive
to teach consumers that a descriptive mark identifies a specific
source. If the mark owner succeeds in doing so, her money and effort may nonetheless be wasted if a court (or the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office) later determines that the mark is generic. If the
mark is deemed generic, despite its acquisition of secondary meaning, and no restrictions are placed on its use by competitors, then
consumers may be harmed because they may be deceived.
B. Functionality’s Grounding in the Common Law and the TrafFix
Pileup
Like descriptive and generic word marks, trade dress was initially ineligible for protection as a trademark under the common
law.51 However, just like weaker word marks (formerly known as
trade names), trade dress was entitled to more limited forms of
protection against unfair competition, particularly in cases involving deliberate deception.52 Even in these very early cases, however,
functional trade dress was exempt from prohibitions on copying by
competitors.53 As the common law has evolved, the functionality
doctrine has waxed and waned in terms of its expansiveness, but
two themes have consistently illuminated the doctrine: (1) the need
to limit protection of trade dress when a prohibition on copying it
would put competitors at an unfair disadvantage; and (2) the need
to preserve the boundary between patent and trademark law by
eliminating trade dress protections that conflict with the policy and
10 (1983) (noting the “long-standing, widely-embraced fallacy that genericism may be
determined by dividing the relevant world of goods into genuses and species”).
49
Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1829 (discussing costs imposed on consumers and
trademark holders by ambiguous distinction between generic and descriptive terms).
50
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
51
See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
52
See infra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
53
See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
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purpose of federal patent law.54 Although the federal courts appeared to have settled on a flexible, factors-based functionality test
that emphasized fair competition, the Supreme Court in TrafFix
Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc. supplanted that rule with a
two-part test.55 TrafFix held that a product feature is functional if
(1) it is “essential to the use or purpose of the article,” or (2) it
“affects the cost or quality of the article.”56 Although TrafFix appeared to create a bright-line rule, it did not engender consistency
or predictability in the functionality doctrine. The circuits are split
in their interpretations of TrafFix, particularly as to relevance (or
lack thereof) of alternative designs.57
1. The Common-Law Expansion of Trade Dress Protection
and the Consequent Rise of the Functionality Doctrine
Like descriptive or generic words or phrases, a product’s trade
dress was not eligible for protection as a trademark under the
common law.58 Not surprisingly, even distinctive forms of trade
dress were not registrable as trademarks under the Trade-Mark Act
of 1905.59 However, not unlike the common-law trade name, if a
form of trade dress had acquired distinctiveness—that is, it was
acting as a source identifier in the minds of consumers—courts of
equity were reluctant to allow competitors to copy the trade dress
and thereby pass off their goods as those of the plaintiff (particularly if they did so deliberately).60 Claims for unfair competition or
54

See discussion infra Section I.B.1.
532 U.S. 23, 31 (2001).
56
Id.
57
See infra notes 129–35 and accompanying text.
58
See Mark Alan Thurmon, The Rise and Fall of Trademark Law’s Functionality
Doctrine, 56 FLA. L. REV. 243, 256–57 (2004) (noting that early common-law courts
“summarily rejected” efforts to obtain trademark protection in various forms of trade
dress).
59
Trade-Mark Act of 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-84, § 5, 33 Stat. 724, 724 (1905) (repealed
1946). The ten-year clause applied only to word marks, and therefore did not enable the
registration of any distinctive forms of trade dress.
60
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 741 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1938) (noting
that unprivileged imitation of a product feature was prohibited when “the feature in fact
identifies source and the imitation is likely to deceive prospective purchasers who care
about source”); Thurmon, supra note 58, at 257–58 (noting that although “early courts
refused to give full trademark status to nontraditional product identifiers, they did
recognize the need to provide some protection” to them); see also Cook & Bernheimer
55
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passing off based on defendant’s copying of plaintiff’s trade dress,
like claims based on defendant’s imitation of plaintiff’s trade name,
turned on two questions: (1) whether plaintiff’s trade dress had acquired distinctiveness; and (2) whether defendant’s copying of that
trade dress led to a likelihood of consumer confusion.61
As the distinctions between legal protection of common-law
trademarks and trade names faded, so too did restrictions on the
protection of trade dress as a nontraditional form of source identifier. Courts began to recognize that various forms of trade dress,
just like word marks or logos, could function as trademarks.62
Modern courts have broadly defined trade dress to include “the
total image of a product” and recognize that it “may include features such as size, shape, color or color combinations, texture,
graphics, or even particular sales techniques.”63
The Lanham Act currently reflects this more expansive interpretation of trade dress and its ability to function as a source identifier. The Act now broadly defines a “trademark” to include any
“word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof” used
in commerce to “identify and distinguish” the goods of the regiCo. v. Ross, 73 F. 203, 205–06 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1896) (finding unfair competition by
defendant based on copying of plaintiff’s square-shaped whiskey bottle, such that the
“consumer, deceived by the shape, will mistake the bottle for one of [the plaintiff’s]”).
61
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 741(b) (prohibiting unprivileged imitation of the
physical appearance of goods when (1) “the copied or imitated feature has acquired
generally in the market a special significance identifying the other’s goods”; and (2) “the
copy or imitation is likely to cause prospective purchasers to regard his goods as those of
the other”). As explained further below, non-functionality was also a requirement for
protection of trade dress. § 741(b)(ii).
62
See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 161–62 (1995) (holding that
color alone could be registered as a trademark under the Lanham Act); Graeme B.
Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A Teleological Approach, 84 IOWA L. REV. 611, 621–22
(1999) (observing that, over time, “the categories of subject matter protected as
trademarks grew to encompass the packaging or receptacles in which products were
contained”).
63
Elmer v. ICC Fabricating, Inc., 67 F.3d 1571, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting John H.
Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983)). However, as
Professor J. Thomas McCarthy aptly noted: “To state that something is capable of trade
dress protection is hardly the same as concluding that it [is] likely to or has become valid
and legally protectable trade dress.” 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 8:4 (4th ed. 2016). Trade dress is protectable
only if it is both (1) distinctive, either through inherent or acquired distinctiveness, and
(2) nonfunctional. Id. § 8:1.
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strant and to indicate their source.64 The Act protects both registered and unregistered trade dress from infringement.65 The Supreme Court has held that some forms of trade dress, primarily
product packaging and logos, may be considered “inherently distinctive,” and therefore are protectable under the Lanham Act
even if they lack evidence of acquired distinctiveness.66 In this aspect, the Lanham Act treats these types of trade dress more favorably than descriptive or other types of word marks that were previously classified as “trade names” under the common law. The
Court has held that two other types of trade dress, product design
and color, can never be considered inherently distinctive.67 These
forms of trade dress are protectable only with a showing of acquired distinctiveness,68 similar to descriptive word marks.
With regard to trade dress in the form of product design, the
courts have consistently recognized the potentially negative competitive effects of extending trademark protection to useful product
features—what is now known as the doctrine of functionality. Early
common-law decisions that recognized product design as a form of
protectable trade dress (although not as a technical trademark) emphasized that, even though unfair competition may exist when “the
defendant, a competitor, has unnecessarily and knowingly imitated
his rival’s devices to such an extent that purchasers are likely to be
deceived by the resemblance of the devices,” such copying was

64

15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). Service marks likewise include any “word, name, symbol,
or device, or any combination thereof” that is used in commerce to “identify and
distinguish” the services of the registrant and to indicate their source. Id.
65
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012) (prohibiting use of any “word, term, name, symbol,
or device, or any combination thereof” that is “likely to cause confusion”); id.
§ 1114(1)(a) (prohibiting infringement of registered trademarks).
66
See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 774 (1992) (finding “no
basis for requiring secondary meaning for inherently distinctive trade dress protection
under [section] 43(a) but not for other distinctive words, symbols, or devices capable of
identifying a producer’s product”).
67
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 212 (2000) (holding that
“[d]esign, like color, is not inherently distinctive”); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 63,
§ 8:12.50 (characterizing the Court’s holding in Samara Brothers as a “bright line rule”).
68
See MCCARTHY, supra note 63, § 8:12.50 (noting that the Supreme Court has
“created two categories of symbols that always required proof of secondary meaning to
achieve the status of a protectable mark or trade dress: (1) a single color of a product; and
(2) the design of a product”).
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permissible if “the points of resemblance are the necessary result
of functional requirements.”69
Even more so than in the genericism context, the common-law
doctrine of functionality reflected the courts’ concern that trademark protection could be used to illegitimately extend the life of an
expired patent. In the Shredded Wheat case, which was also instrumental in defining the parameters of genericide, the Supreme
Court discussed the potential conflict between trade dress protection and the constitutional limits on patent rights:
The plaintiff has not the exclusive right to sell
shredded wheat in the form of a pillow-shaped biscuit—the form in which the article became known
to the public. That is the form in which shredded
wheat was made under the basic patent. The patented machines used were designed to produce only the pillow-shaped biscuits . . . . Hence, upon expiration of the patents the form, as well as the name,
was dedicated to the public.70
The Court also recognized that the defendant/competitor Kellogg had a right to copy the pillow shape of the biscuit because it
was “functional.”71 Thus, “the cost of the biscuit would be increased and its high quality lessened if some other form were substituted for the pillow-shape.”72 Therefore, even in a case not involving an expired patent, the Court recognized that, to preserve
fair competition, trade dress protection could not prevent competitors from replicating “functional” product features.73 In doing so,
69
McGill Mfg. Co. v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 43 F.2d 607, 608 (E.D.N.Y. 1930); see also
Lovell-McConnell Mfg. Co. v. Am. Ever-Ready Co., 195 F. 931, 932 (2d Cir. 1912)
(holding that courts should prevent “imitation in details of construction, with the
consequent likelihood of confusion . . . unless the points of resemblance are the necessary
result of an effort to comply with the physical requirements essential to commercial
success”).
70
Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 119–20 (1938); see also Singer Mfg.
Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896) (“[A]long with the public ownership of the
[previously patented] device there must also necessarily pass to the public the generic
designation of the thing which has arisen during the monopoly in consequence of the
designation having been acquiesced in by the owner, either tacitly . . . or expressly . . . .”).
71
Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 122.
72
Id.
73
Id.
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the Court recognized that, at least in part, the doctrine of functionality was necessary to prevent trademark law from hindering rather than enhancing fair competition.74 However, just as in the genericism context, the Court in Kellogg held that the defendant still
had an obligation to refrain from “passing off or deception,” even
regarding formerly patented and/or functional product features.75
The Court found that the defendant, Kellogg, had acted fairly because it had taken “reasonable precaution to prevent confusion or
the practice of deception in the sale of its product.”76
The First Restatement of Torts was published the same year as
the Supreme Court’s decision in Kellogg.77 Like the Supreme
Court’s decision in Kellogg, the Restatement acknowledged the
protection of trade dress, tempered by the doctrine of functionality.78 First, the Restatement recognized the “unprivileged imitation” of the “physical appearance of goods” as a potential basis for
tort liability, at least as to goods of the same class.79 Such imitation
would provide a basis for liability only when (1) the relevant product features had acquired distinctiveness,80 and (2) defendant’s use
of those features were “likely to cause prospective purchasers to
regard his goods as those of the other,” or, in more modern terms,
likely to cause consumer confusion.81
Second, the Restatement recognized and defined a doctrine of
functionality in the context of trade dress protection. According to
the Restatement, a feature of goods is considered “functional” if it
“affects their purpose, action or performance, or the facility or
74

See id.
Id.
76
Id. at 121–22 (noting that defendant’s “obligation . . . is not to insure that every
purchaser will know it to be the maker [of the product] but to use every reasonable means
to prevent confusion”).
77
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS (AM. LAW INST. 1938).
78
See id. § 741.
79
Id. The Restatement noted that “[t]here is a paucity of authority on the question
whether the interest in the physical appearance of one’s goods is protected against the
imitation or copy of that appearance on goods of a different class,” and therefore took no
position on that issue. Id.
80
The Restatement specifically required “that the copied or imitated feature has
acquired generally in the market a special significance identifying the other’s goods.”
§ 741(b).
81
§ 741.
75
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economy of processing, handling or using them . . . .”82 This definition of functionality equates a functional product feature with a utilitarian one, without the emphasis on preserving fair competition
reflected in the Court’s opinion in Kellogg.83 Under this functionality test, the existence of a “competitive need” for the relevant
product feature (or lack thereof) has little effect, regardless of
whether the feature at issue is or was subject to patent protection.
The Restatement explained that “the shape of a bottle or other
container may be functional though a different bottle or container
may hold the goods equally well.”84 However, the impact of the
exclusion of competitive need from the functionality analysis was
tempered by the Restatement’s restriction on the use of such functional features. Reflecting existing case law, the Restatement specified that if a functional product feature had acquired distinctiveness, competitors who copied it had a duty to “take reasonable
steps to inform prospective purchasers that the goods which he
markets are not those of the other.”85
Professor Mark Thurmon has characterized this Restatement
definition of functionality as a “clear break with the prior case
law,” which had evolved to embrace a more flexible, competitiveneed based analysis of functionality.86 For many years, common
law courts created and implemented various definitions of functionality that fluctuated between more absolute bars to protection of
any utilitarian aspect of a device, primarily driven by the courts’
desire to avoid conflicts with patent law, to a more flexible “com82

Id. § 742. The comment further explains that “[a] feature of goods, or of their
wrappers or containers, may be functional because it contributes to efficiency or economy
in manufacturing them or in handling them through the marketing process,” or because it
“contributes to their utility, to their durability or to the effectiveness or ease with which
they serve their function or are handled by users.” § 742 cmt. a.
83
Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938).
84
§ 742 cmt. a.
85
Id. § 741(b)(2); see also Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 122.
86
Thurmon, supra note 58, at 275; see also Harold R. Weinberg, Trademark Law,
Functional Design Features, and the Trouble with TrafFix, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 10–14
(2001) (characterizing the pre-Restatement period of the functionality doctrine as one
which emphasized the “economic nature” of the doctrine and considered competitive
need for the relevant product feature, unlike the view articulated in the Restatement). It is
unclear why the authors of the Restatement chose to adopt this broader definition of
functionality. See Weinberg, supra, at 15.
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petitive need” rationale, focused more on the need to avoid unfair
competition.87 However, as noted above, because these courts consistently imposed a duty on defendants to refrain from “passing
off” their goods as those of the plaintiff, plaintiffs in trade dress
infringement cases were typically entitled to some form of relief in
such cases, so long as they could prove that their trade dress had
acquired distinctiveness, and defendant’s copying had led to a likelihood of consumer confusion.88
The United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(“CCPA”), created in 1929, and its 1982 successor, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,89 have played a key role in defining the doctrine of functionality. The Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”), the administrative court that reviews
trademark registration decisions from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”).90 Given that this federal appellate court
has the final say in the vast majority of trademark registration disputes, its functionality decisions have been extremely influential
over the rest of the federal circuits, and remain so today. For example, in 1982, the CCPA articulated a decision, In re MortonNorwich Products, Inc., which became the cornerstone of the functionality doctrine in federal courts.91
In Morton-Norwich the CCPA embraced a flexible, competitiveneed-based approach to functionality.92 Under the test adopted by
the CCPA in this case, courts consider the following factors in determining whether a product feature is functional, and hence un87

Thurmon, supra note 58, at 253–82 (examining and describing the common law
evolution of the functionality doctrine, up to the Supreme Court’s decision in TrafFix);
see also Weinberg, supra note 86, at 9–23.
88
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
89
The Federal Courts Improvement Act merged the CCPA and the Court of Claims to
form the Federal Circuit in 1982. Pub. L. No. 97–164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
90
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4) (2012).
91
671 F.2d 1332, 1334 (1982); see also Amy B. Cohen, Following the Direction of TrafFix:
Trade Dress Law and Functionality Revisited, 50 IDEA 593, 625–27 (2010) (analyzing the
Morton-Norwich decision).
92
Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d at 1339 (noting that public policy underlying the
doctrine does not focus on “the right to slavishly copy articles which are not protected by
patent or copyright, but the need to copy those articles, which is more properly termed the
right to compete effectively” (emphasis added)).
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protectable as a trademark: (1) the existence of an expired utility
patent disclosing the utilitarian advantage of the applicable design;93 (2) the existence of advertising by the originator of the design that “touts its utilitarian advantages”;94 (3) whether a “particular design results from a comparatively simple or cheap method
of manufacturing the article”;95 and (4) the availability and appeal
of alternative designs available to competitors.96 Two of these factors focus the courts’ attention on the usefulness of the relevant
product feature by asking whether the party claiming trade dress
protection has publicized the “utilitarian advantages” of the design, either in advertising or in the context of an expired utility patent. The final two factors focus more specifically on the potential
competitive impact of extending trade dress protection to the design, considering the design’s impact on cost and quality of manufacture and the availability of competitively equivalent alternatives.
Taken as a whole, the Morton-Norwich factors clearly reflect the
philosophy that the “right to compete effectively”97 lies at the
heart of the functionality doctrine. Although two of the factors focus on the utilitarian nature of the design, they do so in the context
of identifying the need to copy the design in order to compete effectively in the market for the relevant product. Utilitarianism, in
and of itself, does not render a product feature functional under the
Morton-Norwich factors-based analysis. In fact, the court explicitly
rejected a definition of functionality that would allow for the protection of “the design of a particular article . . . as a trademark only
where the design was useless, that is, wholly unrelated to the function of the article.”98 The court distinguished between the concepts of de facto functionality, the “lay” definition of functionality
that is synonymous with utilitarianism, and de jure functionality, a
93

Id. at 1340–41.
Id. at 1341.
95
Id.; see also Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938) (noting that the
cost of defendant’s product “would be increased and its high quality lessened if some
other form were substituted for the pillow-shape”).
96
Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d at 1341 (noting that “[s]ince the effect upon
competition ‘is really the crux of the matter,’ it is, of course, significant that there are
other alternatives available” (citation omitted)).
97
Id. at 1339.
98
Id. at 1338.
94
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legal conclusion rendering a design unprotectable as a mark.99 In
Morton-Norwich, the Federal Circuit sought to create a functionality doctrine that balanced the need to prevent trade dress infringement with the right to copy in an effort to preserve fair competition.100
Numerous federal courts adopted the Morton-Norwich approach
to functionality, with its focus on competitive necessity and the
availability of alternative designs.101 The Third Restatement of Unfair Competition, published in 1995, reflected this view, defining a
“functional” product feature as one that “affords benefits in the
manufacturing, marketing, or use of the goods or services with
which the design is used . . . that are important to effective competition by others and that are not practically available through the
use of alternative designs.”102
2. The Supreme Court’s Modification of the Functionality
Doctrine
The Supreme Court first dipped its toe into the functionality
waters in 1982, the same year the CCPA decided the MortonNorwich case. The Court’s decision in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v.
Ives Laboratories, Inc. primarily addressed the doctrine of contributory trademark infringement.103 However, in a footnote regarding a
functionality defense that was not addressed in the majority opinion, the Court noted that “[i]n general terms, a product feature is
functional if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it
affects the cost or quality of the article.”104 This footnote did not
embrace the competitive necessity rationale articulated by the
CCPA/Federal Circuit and the Third Restatement of Unfair Com99

Id. at 1337.
Id. at 1340 (noting the need to “strike a balance between the ‘right to copy’ and the
right to protect one’s method of trade identification” in the context of the functionality
doctrine (citation omitted)).
101
See Thurmon, supra note 58, at 282–96 (describing the evolution of the case law
during this period).
102
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1995). The
Second Restatement of Torts, which was published in the interim between the First
Restatement of Torts and the Third Restatement of Unfair Competition, did not address
this topic. See Thurmon, supra note 58, at 292.
103
See 456 U.S. 844, 862–63 (1982).
104
Id. at 850 n.10.
100
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petition, because it set up a two-part test that did not mention or
apparently consider the existence of competitively equivalent alternative designs as part of the functionality analysis.105 However,
it was properly characterized as dicta by most of the courts that
considered it and did not have a significant impact on the functionality doctrine.106
The Supreme Court appeared to clarify its functionality jurisprudence, in line with the Federal Circuit’s competitive necessity
test, in a subsequent opinion, Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products
Co.107 In this case, the Court initially adopted the two-part test
originally stated in Inwood: “[I]n general terms, a product feature is
functional, and cannot serve as a trademark, if it is essential to the
use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the
article.”108 However, the Court went on to characterize this statement in a way that reflected the competitive necessity rationale, by
defining a product feature as functional, if the exclusive use of that
feature “would put competitors at a significant non-reputationrelated disadvantage.”109 Although Qualitex did not mention the
alternative design factor, it implied that the factor was relevant by
emphasizing competitive disadvantage as central to the functionality doctrine.110 If an alternative, competitively equivalent design exists, a business will not suffer a “significant non-reputation-related
disadvantage,” if forced to choose the alternative design over the
design that acts as a source identifier for its competitor.111 By emphasizing the competitive necessity rationale, the Court appeared
to bring its limited functionality jurisprudence in line with the extensive development of the doctrine in the lower federal courts,
particularly the Federal Circuit.

105

Compare id., with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17.
See, e.g., LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 1985)
(characterizing the Supreme Court’s functionality definition in Inwood as dictum);
Cohen, supra note 91, at 627–35 (discussing the lower courts’ treatment of the
functionality definition stated in Inwood).
107
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995).
108
Id. at 165 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Inwood, 456 U.S. at 850 n.10).
109
Id.
110
See id.
111
Id.
106
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The relative stability of the federal courts’ functionality jurisprudence at this point rendered the impact of the Court’s 2001
decision in TrafFix all the more surprising. In TrafFix, the Court
repeated the Inwood two-part test for functionality: A product feature is functional if (1) it is “essential to the use or purpose of the
article,” or (2) it “affects the cost or quality of the article.”112
However, rather than embrace competitive necessity as a fundamental underpinning of the doctrine, with its concomitant reliance
on the availability of alternative designs, the Court rejected it.113
The Court pronounced that “[w]here the design is functional under the Inwood formulation there is no need to proceed further to
consider if there is a competitive necessity for the feature.”114 The
Court went on to reverse the underlying Sixth Circuit decision,
finding the product feature at issue to be nonfunctional on the
grounds that the circuit court had given undue weight to the availability of alternative designs.115
Many courts and commentators were caught off guard by the
Court’s decision, given that the Court granted certiorari in TrafFix
to resolve a circuit split regarding a different issue: whether the existence of an expired utility patent rendered a product feature functional, a question it declined to answer.116 The question regarding
the existence of an expired utility patent arose in the lower courts
because of the concern that the Morton-Norwich analysis did not
adequately police the boundaries of patent and trademark law,117
which had long been viewed as a free-standing justification for the
functionality doctrine itself. The Court, however, explicitly de112

TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 24 (2001) (quoting
Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165).
113
Id. at 33.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 33–34.
116
Id. at 28 (noting that certiorari was granted to resolve a circuit split over the issue of
“whether the existence of an expired utility patent forecloses the possibility of the
patentee’s claiming trade dress protection in the product’s design”); id. at 35 (declining
to resolve the question of whether the “Patent Clause of the Constitution of its own
force, prohibits the holder of an expired utility patent from claiming trade dress
protection” (citation omitted)).
117
See, e.g., Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1507
(10th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the idea that “no patent law purpose is served by allowing
copying of product configurations that are not necessary to competition”).
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clined to limit its articulation of the functionality doctrine to cases
in which the competitive need rationale provoked a conflict with
the Patent Clause of the Constitution.118 Unlike the MortonNorwich four-factor analysis, the TrafFix two-part test makes no
mention of utility patents.119 The Court reasoned that “[w]hether a
utility patent has expired or there has been no utility patent at all, a
product design . . . may be functional because it is ‘essential to the
use or purpose of the article’ or ‘affects the cost or quality of the
article.’”120 TrafFix did hold that the existence of an expired utility
patent created a strong presumption of functionality, but it did so
because the patent offers proof that the two-part test has been satisfied.121 The Court’s consideration of utility patents in the context of functionality is therefore primarily grounded in utilitarianism, not the constitutional right to copy.
Although the Supreme Court in TrafFix seemed to reject the
relevance of alternative designs in the context of utilitarian functionality doctrine, it did suggest that competitive necessity still
could determine whether a design or product feature was aesthetically functional. The Court explained that its previous statement—
providing that “a functional feature is one the ‘exclusive use of
[which] would put competitors at a significant non-reputationrelated disadvantage’”—applied only in cases of aesthetic functionality (the “question involved in Qualitex”).122 The Court in Qualitex held that color alone, specifically the green-gold color of dry
cleaning pads, could (and in that case did) become a source identifier, and hence a legally protectable trademark.123 Qualitex further
held that the functionality doctrine did not prohibit the protection
of color as a form of trade dress under the Lanham Act.124
118

TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 35.
Compare id., with In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1340–41
(C.C.P.A. 1982).
120
TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 35 (emphasis added) (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs.,
Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982)).
121
Id. at 29–30 (“A prior patent, we conclude, has vital significance in resolving the
trade dress claim. A utility patent is strong evidence that the features therein claimed are
functional.”).
122
Id. at 33 (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995)).
123
Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162–64.
124
Id. at 166.
119
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The Court in TrafFix therefore created two functionality tests:
one for cases of utilitarian functionality (in which competitive necessity and alternative designs would be considered irrelevant), and
another for cases implicating the aesthetic functionality doctrine
(where competitive necessity remained central to the doctrine).125
However, even the facts of Qualitex itself do not neatly fit into the
aesthetic functionality box created by the Court. The TrafFix
Court observed that in Qualitex there was “no indication that the
green-gold color of the laundry press pad had any bearing on the
use or purpose of the product or its cost or quality.”126 In so observing, the Court appears not to have carefully considered its own
prior reasoning. In fact, the Qualitex Court did find that the greengold color was utilitarian in the context of a dry cleaning pad: it
served to avoid “noticeable stains.”127 The color was nonetheless
determined to be nonfunctional, as the Court found that there was
“no competitive need in the press pad industry for the green-gold
color, since other colors [were] equally usable.”128 In other words,
competitors did not need to copy the green-gold color to hide
stains on their dry cleaning pads, because other colors would hide
stains just as well.
The confusion wrought by the TrafFix decision in the context
of the functionality doctrine has been well documented.129 The
federal circuits have split in their interpretations of the rules
created by TrafFix, especially regarding the relevance, or lack thereof, of alternative designs in the context of utilitarian functionality.130 The Federal Circuit has interpreted the TrafFix opinion narrowly, concluding that the Court’s decision in TrafFix did not fundamentally alter the Morton-Norwich four-factor approach to functionality, and, therefore, consideration of alternative designs re125

See discussion supra notes 112–15, 122–24.
TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33.
127
Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 166.
128
Id. (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., No. CV 90 1183 HLH(JRX), 1991
WL 318798, *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 1991)).
129
See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 91, at 667; Brett Ira Johnson, Trade Dress Functionality: A
Doctrine in Need of Clarification, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 125, 130 (2011).
130
See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 91, at 667 (concluding that “the varied approaches to the
treatment of alternative designs, reflected both in the split in the circuit court as well as
the decisions of the various district courts [in the wake of TrafFix], is troubling and
confusing”).
126
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mains “properly part of the overall mix” in determining whether a
product feature should be considered functional in the first instance.131 Other circuits have read the TrafFix decision more broadly and consequently determined that, if a product feature is utilitarian—that is, it is “essential to the use or purpose of the article or
if it affects the cost or quality of the article”—it is functional and
cannot be protected.132 Thus, “[t]he availability of alternative designs is irrelevant.”133 In applying this test, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the party claiming trade dress protection failed to prove
non-functionality, because it did not show that the relevant product
feature was an “arbitrary flourish” that served no purpose in the
underlying product.134 While most courts agree that the availability
of alternative designs should still be considered in the context of
aesthetic functionality cases, distinguishing between aesthetic and
utilitarian functionality cases poses its own problems.135
The existence of a circuit split on any legal issue creates confusion and uncertainty, and the potential for forum shopping, among
litigants. In the trademark context, it is particularly disruptive to
have a difference of opinion between the Federal Circuit, which
hears all appeals from TTAB registration decisions,136 and its sister
circuits, which also decide questions of trademark registrability or
mark validity in the context of infringement lawsuits.137 All parties
would benefit if the courts could adopt a unified functionality definition in the wake of TrafFix, or, alternately, if the Court clarified
its jurisprudence on this issue.
131

Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also
McAirlaids, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 756 F.3d 307, 311 (4th Cir. 2014).
132
Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH, 289 F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir.
2002) (quoting TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001)).
133
Id. (citing TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33–34); see also Groeneveld Transport Efficiency, Inc.
v. Lubecore Int’l, Inc., 730 F.3d 494, 506–07 (6th Cir. 2013) (rejecting consideration of
alternative designs).
134
Eppendorf, 289 F.3d at 357–58.
135
See Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distrib., 369 F.3d 1197, 1203–04 & n.7 (11th
Cir. 2004) (holding ice cream color to be functional under both utilitarian and aesthetic
analyses); Baughman Tile Co. v. Plastic Tubing, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 720, 722 n.2
(E.D.N.C. 2002) (applying utilitarian functionality doctrine analysis to determine
whether the color of plastic tubing should be considered functional).
136
28 U.S.C § 1295(a)(4)(B) (2012).
137
15 U.S.C. § 1121 (2012).
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3. The Current Status of Functionality Under the Lanham Act
The doctrine of functionality, like the genericism doctrine, has
increased in importance due to the elevated significance of trademark registration and the expansion of trademark protection generally under the Lanham Act. However, unlike genericism, which
appeared as a bar to registration in the original version of the Lanham Act passed in 1948, Congress did not codify the functionality
doctrine until fifty years later in 1998.138 Like generic words or
phrases, the current version of the Lanham Act excludes functional
aspects of product design from protection.139 A functional design
may not be registered as a trademark, even if it is has acquired distinctiveness.140 If registered, it may be canceled at any time, even if
it is encompassed within a mark that would otherwise be considered incontestable.141 To state a claim for infringement of unregistered trade dress under the Lanham Act, the plaintiff has the burden of proving “that the matter sought to be protected is not functional.”142 However, the Lanham Act does not define the word
“functional.” Instead, the courts have attempted to do so, as described above.143 Moreover, the Lanham Act—unlike the common
law—does not provide “functional” product features with a limited degree of protection, even if they have acquired secondary
meaning.144 As both the Lanham Act and common law have embraced product design as a form of trademark, and the significance
of the protections extended to trademarks has increased, it has become even more important to have a clear, workable functionality
doctrine designed to preserve and protect fair competition.

138

Technical Corrections to Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 105-330, 112 Stat.
3069 (1998); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 63, § 7:63.
139
See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (2012).
140
See id. (barring registration of any putative mark that “comprises any matter that, as
a whole, is functional”). Functional product features may not be registered with a
showing of acquired distinctiveness. See § 1052(f).
141
See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(8) (2012). (providing that an incontestable mark may be
subject to the defense that it is functional); id. § 1064(3) (providing that a mark may be
cancelled “[a]t any time if the registered mark . . . is functional”).
142
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) (2012).
143
See supra notes 103–35 and accompanying text.
144
See supra notes 139–42 and accompanying text.
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II. GENERICISM AND FUNCTIONALITY: COMMON THEMES
FOR REFORM
Over the years, the genericism and functionality doctrines have
evolved, both in their significance and in their obtuseness. Flexible,
common-law principles of unfair competition have given way to
more formalistic, bright-line rules, especially as these rules have
been codified and federalized. Rather than enhance predictability,
however, these rules have had the opposite effect. Moreover, in
adopting an all-or-nothing approach to trademarks deemed generic
or functional, the courts have, in various respects, tolerated or even
enabled some degree of consumer confusion, which injures both
competitors and the public. By reorienting the doctrines towards
their common-law roots, courts can improve outcomes and, perhaps more importantly, enhance consistency and predictability as
courts attempt to mark the boundaries of trademark law.
A. Redefining and Simplifying Genericism and Functionality
The tests developed by the courts to address the issues of genericism and functionality have proven difficult to apply and have
drawn the doctrines away from their original purpose: to ensure
free and fair competition.145 In doing so, these doctrines have unintentionally imposed costs on consumers as well. By refocusing the
doctrines on the core ideal of free and fair competition, courts can
simplify the doctrines and achieve more consistent and predictable
results, to the benefit of competitors and consumers alike.
1. Refocusing Genericism on the Primary Significance Test
In the genericism context, the court’s analysis of whether a
putative mark is functioning as a source identifier when consumers
are using it in a commercial setting should answer the question of
whether the putative mark is deemed generic in the vast majority of
cases. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Kellogg emphasized that a
valid trademark exists when “the primary significance of the term in
the minds of the consuming public is not the product but the producer.”146 The Court recognized that words or terms can have dual
145
146

See supra notes 42–49, 129–35 and accompanying text.
Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938) (emphasis added).
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meanings—one generic and one not—at the same time; the question is which definition predominates in the minds of consumers.147
The Court found that, under the facts of that case, any sourceidentifying significance retained by the Shredded Wheat mark had
become a “subordinate meaning” of the term.148 Therefore, the
term was no longer protectable as a trademark.
As the author and Deven Desai have previously argued, courts
have both over-simplified and unnecessarily complicated this analysis.149 The various tests developed by the courts to ferret out generic words—e.g., genus/species, who-are-you, what-are-you—
attempt to put words into neat categorical boxes, without sufficiently taking into account the context in which they are being used
and perceived by consumers. Many, if not most, words in the English language have multiple meanings. Outside the confines of
trademark law, such linguistic flexibility is rarely considered problematic, because meaning is determined from context. For example, if the word “snow” were to be used in casual conversation, the
listener would be able to tell whether the speaker intended to reference (1) frozen precipitation, (2) a dessert, (3) cocaine, or (4) to
deceive, all of which are dictionary definitions of the word
“snow.”150 However, if an erstwhile trademark co-exists with an
alternative, generic meaning of the same word, courts and the Patent and Trademark Office are quick to point to that alternative
meaning as evidence that the word (or words) cannot be a trademark.
Courts therefore over-rely on evidence derived from dictionaries, newspapers, and the like to prove the death or nonexistence of
a trademark:
Dictionary entries and media uses certainly may reflect some of the ways in which a term is used.
These noncommercial uses of a trademark are,
however, poor barometers of the consumer’s perception of the mark in commercial contexts and—
unlike competitive misuse of the mark—they do not
147
148
149
150

See id.
Id.
See Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1836.
See id. at 1838–39.
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necessarily affect consumer perceptions in commercial settings.151
In truth, this type of evidence proves little other than the fact
that the putative trademark also has a non-trademark meaning associated with it. The court’s primary task, in such cases, is to determine whether the “generic” meaning of the term is primary or
subordinate, when viewed by consumers in a commercial setting.
Over-relying on noncommercial uses of a mark as evidence of
genericism also has the pernicious effect of undermining the fair
use doctrine. Particularly as applied to words or terms that may
otherwise be considered descriptive, it should be obvious that such
terms would appear in the lexicon in their non-trademark sense.
Indeed, the descriptive fair use doctrine presumes that such uses
will occur and shields them from a claim of trademark infringement.152 However, by pointing to such uses as indicative of the
term’s invalidity as a mark, the genericism doctrine indirectly incentivizes trademark holders to “police” uses of their marks that
should be considered fair. This type of over-enforcement of trademark rights may lead to trademark bullying or at least the perception of it, which imposes its own set of costs on society.153
2. Rationalizing Functionality
As discussed above, the Supreme Court’s rewriting of the functionality doctrine has been widely criticized.154 In TrafFix, the
Court expanded the definition of a functional product feature, unmooring the doctrine from its underpinnings in the law of unfair
competition. TrafFix arguably reoriented functionality by redirecting courts’ attention away from the competitive impact of extending trade dress protection to a product feature, and instead focus151

Id. at 1836.
See, e.g., KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111,
123 (2004) (holding that, while descriptive fair use is not defeated by a showing of
likelihood of confusion, the degree of confusion may be pertinent to whether defendant’s
use of the plaintiff’s mark is fair); Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores
Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2010) (defining and applying descriptive
fair use doctrine).
153
See generally Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625
(2011).
154
See supra note 129.
152

2017]

TOWARD A MORE COHERENT DOCTRINE

723

ing their attention on the question of whether the trade dress at issue should be considered utilitarian. It also created an illusory distinction between aesthetic functionality cases, in which the Court
still permits application of competitive necessity rationale, and utilitarian ones, which, as explained above, now appear to exclude this
type of analysis.155 The doctrine should be redirected toward its
pro-competitive roots.
In considering whether a product feature or design should be
considered functional, a court’s primary focus should be a relatively simple one: Will limiting the ability of competitors to use this
product feature negatively impact their ability to fairly compete in
the market for this product? The Morton-Norwich factors, slightly
reconfigured, are relevant in answering this basic question: (1) does
this design feature make this product work, or make it work better?156 (2) would the producer incur additional cost if forced to
eliminate or alter this design feature? and (3) does this design feature make the product appeal to consumers in a way that is not related to its source-identifying function? A positive response to any
of these questions should create a presumption of functionality,
because restricting the right to copy any such product feature could
unfairly hinder free and fair competition. However, that presumption should be rebuttable: If the design feature does confer some
benefit in terms of the product’s function or appeal to consumers,
are there equally attractive means that can be used to achieve the
same result, without imposing additional costs? If so, the competitor should choose one of those alternatives, to avoid creating
a likelihood of consumer confusion, assuming that the plaintiff has
proven both acquired distinctiveness of the product design and
likelihood of confusion. In applying this test, a court should be able
to determine whether a product feature is functional in the vast majority of cases.
However, as discussed more thoroughly below, the need to
avoid conflict with patent law requires consideration of a final
155

See discussion supra notes 112–15 and 122–24.
One factor emphasized by the Morton-Norwich court was whether the party claiming
trade dress protection of a product design had advertised the utilitarian benefits of that
design. See In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1338–41 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
Such advertising would constitute proof and/or an admission that such benefits existed.
156
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question in some functionality cases.157 Many, if not most, product
designs that function as trade dress are not the subject of an expired utility patent;158 as to these types of designs, there is no direct
conflict with patent law. Moreover, if a design feature was formerly
covered by a utility patent, it will, in most cases, make the product
work, or work better in some respect, thereby conferring a competitive advantage on the patent holder. In these types of cases, the
analysis described above will render the product feature functional,
thereby again avoiding a direct conflict with patent law. However,
it is possible that a patented design feature (or one claim within a
patent) may have no utilitarian impact on the underlying product
or otherwise impact competition in the manner described above. In
such cases, the court should directly examine whether extending
trade dress protection would effectively extend the patent monopoly: Would it prevent competitors from copying the previously patented device? If so, the product feature may be deemed functional
for this reason as well, without consideration of alternative designs.159
One benefit of this unified definition is that it eliminates the
need for courts to attempt to distinguish between instances of utilitarian and aesthetic functionality. Aesthetic aspects of product design—as in the case of the color of the dry-cleaning pads in Qualitex, discussed above160—often serve a utilitarian purpose as well as
a source-identifying function. Courts should not discount or ignore
the source-identifying capacity of a product feature merely because
it is simultaneously utilitarian. By doing so, they potentially impose
costs on consumers and business owners by enabling a defendant to
pass off his goods as those of the plaintiff.
157

See infra notes 191–253 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 194–99 and accompanying text.
159
This recommendation for reform essentially follows the reasoning of the Tenth
Circuit in Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir.
1995), a case that preceded the Supreme Court’s decision in TrafFix. In Vornado, the
Tenth Circuit held that “where a disputed product configuration is part of a claim in a
utility patent, and the configuration is a described, significant inventive aspect of the
invention . . . so that without it the invention could not fairly be said to be the same
invention, patent law prevents its protection as trade dress, even if the configuration is
nonfunctional.” Id. at 1510.
160
See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text.
158
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Moreover, by restricting trade dress protection to those product features that exist only as an “arbitrary flourish,”161 the functionality doctrine intrudes upon and merges with the doctrine of
inherent distinctiveness. Some forms of trade dress may be considered inherently distinctive, and the test for determining whether
they satisfy that standard sounds remarkably similar to the definition of functionality adopted by many federal courts postTrafFix.162 This merger of standards is doubly confusing, given that
the Supreme Court has held that the forms of trade dress most typically associated with the functionality doctrine—color and product
design—can never be considered inherently distinctive, even if
they are, in fact, arbitrary and serve no utilitarian purpose.163
Like word marks, features of trade dress may serve a dual function in practice and in the mind of the consumer. To the consumer,
they may simultaneously have a utilitarian purpose and act as a
source identifier. In determining which function predominates (or,
to borrow word mark terminology, the primary significance of the
mark), a court must necessarily consider whether alternatives to
the relevant product feature are available to the competitor and are
truly equal to their source-identifying counterpart. However, as
161

TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34 (2001); EppendorfNetheler-Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH, 289 F.3d 351, 357 (5th Cir. 2002).
162
The term “arbitrary” is frequently used by courts when attempting to define
inherently distinctive trade dress. The case most frequently cited and relied upon by
other courts in making this determination, Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods Ltd.,
uses the term “arbitrary” as though it were synonymous with “distinctive” in this
context. See 568 F.2d 1342, 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (“In determining whether a design is
arbitrary or distinctive this court has looked to . . . [various factors.]”); see also Paddington
Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 584 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that,
because product packaging was “undeniably arbitrary,” it was inherently distinctive and
did not require proof of secondary meaning to be protectable); Chevron Chem. Co. v.
Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 702 (5th Cir. 1981) (reasoning that “[i]f
the features of the trade dress sought to be protected are arbitrary and serve no function
either to describe the product or assist in its effective packaging,” the trade dress should
be considered inherently distinctive).
163
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 212 (2000) (holding that
“[d]esign, like color, is not inherently distinctive”); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co.,
514 U.S. 159, 162–63 (1995) (analogizing color to a descriptive word mark, which is
protectable only if it develops secondary meaning over time); see also MCCARTHY, supra
note 63, § 8:12.50 (noting that the Supreme Court has “created two categories of symbols
that always required proof of secondary meaning to achieve the status of a protectable
mark or trade dress: (1) a single color of a product; and (2) the design of a product”).
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discussed below, when trademark protection of such product features collides directly with the policies underlying the Patent and
Copyright Clause of the Constitution, trademark law must yield.164
Therefore, if trade dress protection is sought for a product feature
that is a “described, significant inventive aspect”165 of an expired
utility patent, competitors should not be required to adopt alternative designs.
B. The Patent Dilemma and the Importance of Alternatives
One policy justification for both the genericism and functionality doctrines lies within the constitutional authorization for a different form of intellectual property: patents. The Constitution enables
Congress to grant an inventor an “exclusive [r]ight” to her discoveries for “limited [t]imes,” for the purpose of promoting “the
useful [a]rts.”166 Trademarks are not subject to the time limitation
that is constitutionally imposed on a patent, and therefore they may
last in perpetuity, so long as the mark at issue continues to be
used.167 The heart of the potential conflict between patent and
trademark law lies in this temporal disparity. The Supreme Court
has held that a patent owner cannot evade the statutory and constitutional time limit on a patent by recasting his invention as a form
of trade dress protected under the auspices of trademark law.168
Both the genericism and functionality doctrines exist, in part, to
police this boundary between patents and trademarks. This Article
argues, however, that this policing function is implicated in only a
minority of cases raising issues of genericism and functionality.
Even in that context, if the functionality and genericism doctrines
focus on preserving fair competition, they will simultaneously ad-

164

See infra notes 219–26 and accompanying text.
Vornado Air Circulation Sys, Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1510 (10th Cir.
1995).
166
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
167
Under the Lanham Act, a federal trademark registration does not expire after a set
period of time. The Act requires the owner of a federally registered mark to file a renewal
application with the USPTO attesting to the continued use of the mark in commerce and
to pay a specified fee every ten years. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058–1059 (2012). If the mark owner
fulfils these obligations, the mark may theoretically last in perpetuity.
168
See Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120 (1938); Singer Mfg. Co. v.
June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896).
165

2017]

TOWARD A MORE COHERENT DOCTRINE

727

here to the limitations of patent monopolies—at least in the vast
majority of cases.
1. The Link Between Expired Patents and Genericide
The genericism doctrine, which almost exclusively applies to
word marks, is not often considered critical or even relevant to the
patent/trademark boundary discussed above. However, some of
the earliest examples of genericide—the process by which a valid
trademark loses its source-identifying significance and becomes a
generic word—arose from cases involving expired utility patents.
When the patent expires on an invention, the ability to exploit that
patent may be thwarted if the trademark used to identify it has
evolved to signify the generic product rather than the brand. In
such cases, the trademark is rendered invalid via genericide, thus
enabling competitors to copy it, much like the expired patent itself.
Competitive necessity compels this result as well. The existence
and promotion of an alternative, generic name for the goods produced under the patent may resolve both the conflict with patent
law and the anticompetitive effects of trademark protection in this
scenario, thus avoiding the genericide of the mark.169
A classic genericide case, Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co. exemplifies the link between genericide of a trademark and expiration of an
underlying patent.170 In Bayer, the manufacturer of a drug sold under the trademark Aspirin proffered the alternative term “acetyl
salicylic acid” as an alternative to the trademark.171 Perhaps not
surprisingly, this “extraordinary collocation of letters,”172 in the
words of Judge Learned Hand, did not catch on. Judge Hand found
that consumers did not understand the word “aspirin” to mean
“anything more than a kind of drug,” despite the manufacturer’s

169

Trademark attorney Jerre Swann argued in 1999 (pre-TrafFix) that genericism
should take a page from the functionality playbook and similarly put the availability of
alternatives at the center of the doctrine rather than on the periphery. See Jerre B. Swann,
Genericism Rationalized, 89 TRADEMARK REP. 639, 650 (1999).
170
272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
171
Id. at 510.
172
Id. Judge Learned Hand’s colorful description actually referred to an alternative
name for the drug, “monoaceticacidester of salicylic acid,” but it captured the essence of
both generic names for the drug. Id.
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belated efforts to infuse it with source-identifying significance.173
The court further found that consumers did not understand “aspirin” and “acetyl salicylic acid” to be the same drug.174 Because the
word “aspirin” did not retain any source-identifying significance,
it was not entitled to protection as a trademark.175
The problem faced by the drug manufacturer in Bayer is not
unique. The inventor who creates and patents a unique product
may effectively “fall victim to [his] own success” when he attempts to obtain or maintain trademark protection for the name of
his product, after the patent has expired.176 If there is only one
source for a particular good or service, then the mark that identifies
the source may also become the word that identifies the thing itself.177 Under these circumstances, competitors who wish to copy
and exploit the formerly patented invention may need to label their
copies with the same trademark used by the inventor, because the
public understands nothing else.178
173

Id.
Id.
175
Id.
176
Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1820 (alteration in original).
177
Id. at 1820–21 (“Because the trademark/patent holder enjoys a monopoly over the
production of the good during the patent period, the trademark label placed on the good
typically serves a dual function: to identify the sole source of the good (i.e., the trademark
holder) and to identify the good itself. When the patent period ends, consumers continue
to identify the good by using the trademark.”).
178
But see Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of
Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1502–04 (2002). Parchomovsky and Siegelman
wrote that Singer Manufacutring Co. v. June Manufacturing Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896), and
Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938), held that “the generic name by
which a patented invention has become known falls into the public domain at the
expiration of the patent.” Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra, at 1502. They critiqued this
holding, based on an economic theory of leveraged patents, as failing to recognize and
maximize the benefits of allowing an inventor to enjoy trademark protection after the
expiration of a patent. Id. at 1503–04.
Parchomovsky and Siegelman’s economic analysis arguably does not accurately
distinguish between generic names and non-generic marks in terms of the economic value
of post-patent trademark protections. Genericide, as explained above, is not an
unavoidable consequence of patent protection. However, when it does occur,
competitors’ ability to exploit the expired patent may be severely compromised if the
generic name is protected as a trademark, negatively impacting the market for the
formerly patented product and, consequently, the consumers who buy it. Trademark law,
therefore, should distinguish between marks that have become generic names and those
that have not, particularly in cases involving expired patents.
174
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The genericide of trademarks associated with expired utility patents is not, however, inevitable. So long as a viable alternative to
the trademarked name exists, neither patent law nor the law of unfair competition requires the invalidation of the trademark. A viable
alternative exists when consumers can and do use alternative words
to identify the good or service at issue, other than the trademark.
As a result, patent holders should strive to develop and adapt
workable, alternative names for their patented inventions (assuming they do not already exist), in addition to selecting a viable
trademark for the purpose of identifying and marketing their inventions. If they fail to do so, they may fall victim to their own success,
as described above. Admittedly, even if an alternative name exists,
the trademark owner may not be able to convince the public to use
it. The trademark owner can, however, increase the chances of
success in this regard by (1) using the name itself, in conjunction
with the trademark, in identifying its own goods or services, and
(2) choosing an alternative generic name that is not lengthy or difficult to pronounce, spell, or remember.179
Trademarks can fall victim to genericide, of course, in cases
that do not involve expired patents. Similarly, consumers’ access
to viable alternatives (or lack thereof) should play a critical role in
any genericism determination; the significance of alternative monikers, from a competitive standpoint, is or should not be limited to
cases involving expired patents. A patent imparts a legal monopoly
that creates a finite period of market dominance. For the reasons
stated above, that monopoly can erode the source-identifying significance of a trademark. The same phenomenon may occur outside
the patent context, when market dominance occurs for other reasons, such as superior quality of product or effective marketing.
Unlike the case involving a utility patent, in this context the trademark holder enjoys market dominance solely due to her own commercial success. Here as well, the genericide doctrine prevents
trademark law from artificially suppressing competition. Just as in
the case of a formerly patented product, if the public equates the
trademark with the thing itself, competitors should be allowed to
179

Bayer’s proffered alternatives to the trademark Aspirin—“acetyl salicylic acid” or
“monoaceticacidester of salicylicacid”—would not satisfy this standard. Bayer, 272 F. at
510.
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use the name that the public understands. Again, alternatives are
key: If no alternative name exists as a viable substitute for the putative trademark, then competitive necessity may require the denial
of trademark protection, as consumers may recognize no other
name as referring to the good or service in question.
There are numerous examples of trademark/generic combinations that are concurrently recognized by consumers, allowing the
trademark holder to retain the source-identifying significance of its
mark, despite enjoying a period of market dominance. For example,
consumers recognize the word “Google” as the name of one of the
most successful companies in the world.180 Google is, of course, a
federally registered trademark.181 In 2016, Forbes estimated the
value of Google brand at over $82.5 billion.182 However, the Google
trademark was recently challenged, and its cancellation sought, on
the grounds that it was generic.183 In so doing, the plaintiff argued
that “a majority of the public understands the word google, when
used as a verb, to mean the indiscriminate act of searching the Internet without regard to the search engine used.”184 The court correctly found that, even though some portion of the public does use
the word “google” in this manner, this usage of the mark does not
demonstrate that it has become generic.185 To determine the primary significance of the word “google,” the court correctly focused on the “use and understanding of the mark in the context of
purchasing decisions.”186
Even if a majority of the public used the word “google” in the
manner described by the plaintiff, the result would not necessarily
be genericide, so long as the majority of the public also recognizes
that Google is a specific, highly effective search engine.187 Con180

See The World’s Most Valuable Brands, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/powerfulbrands/list/ [https://perma.cc/2T7K-WT3Y] (last visited Mar. 31, 2017).
181
GOOGLE, Registration No. 4,525,914.
182
See The World’s Most Valuable Brands, supra note 180.
183
Elliot v. Google Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1161 (D. Ariz. 2014), appeal docketed, No.
15-15809 (9th Cir. Apr. 22, 2015).
184
Id.
185
Id. at 1173–75.
186
Id. at 1162 (quoting 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 63, § 12:8); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995).
187
Elliot, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 1173 (discussing survey evidence and expert opinions).
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sumers’ concurrent generic use of the term signifies Google’s dominance of the search engine market, not the collapse of its trademark validity.188 Unlike the term “acetyl salicylic acid” in Bayer,
which was meaningless to the average consumer,189 the term
“search engine” is used and understood by consumers who also
identify Google as a particular search engine.190 Consumers would
be confused and misled if Yahoo and Bing labeled themselves
“Google” or invited consumers to “Google” on their search engines. Neither the competitive market for search engines nor the
integrity of the patent system would be improved by allowing
Google’s competitors to use its name in this manner.
Therefore, although genericide does play a role in policing the
boundary between trademark and patent law, that function is subsidiary to the doctrine’s broader competitive focus. Any trademark
may need to be invalidated on grounds of genericism if the public
recognizes no other name as identifying the good or service to
which it is attached. Otherwise competitors are unfairly tonguetied in marketing their wares. The patent monopoly creates the
perfect conditions for this type of market impact, but the genericide phenomenon is not limited to cases involving expired utility
patents. Whenever a trademark holder enjoys a period of market
dominance—engendered by either a federally-enforced patent monopoly or the fruits of her own commercial success—she needs to
ensure that consumers can understand and use some name other
than her trademark to refer to the good or service at issue. Without
a viable alternative, the trademark will cease to function as such.
2. Patents and Functionality
Much more so than the genericism doctrine, the functionality
principle has traditionally been viewed by courts and commentators alike as a bulwark between trade dress protection, under both
the Lanham Act and the common law, and the bounds of federal
patent law. This Section argues that, to some degree, this aspect of
188

See Laura A. Heymann, The Grammar of Trademarks, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
1313, 1348 (2010) (noting that use of a trademark as a verb may be an indication of brand
strength and “enduring fame” rather than genericism).
189
See Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
190
See Elliot, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 1173–75.
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the functionality doctrine has been overstated. Moreover, a functionality doctrine primarily aimed at preserving a level competitive
playing field will almost always protect the legal space that has been
carved out, both legislatively and constitutionally, for patents.
The Supreme Court described the patent/trademark conflict,
and functionality’s role in resolving it, in Qualitex:
It is the province of patent law, not trademark law,
to encourage invention by granting inventors a monopoly over new product designs or functions for a
limited time, after which competitors are free to use
the innovation. If a product’s functional features
could be used as trademarks, however, a monopoly
over such features could be obtained without regard
to whether they qualify as patents and could be extended forever (because trademarks may be renewed in perpetuity).191
Qualitex identified two problems associated with extending
trade dress protection to functional product features, vis-à-vis patent law: (1) functional product features that satisfy the requirements of patentability should not be accorded protection for an unlimited period of time, because the Constitution specifies that patent monopolies may be extended only for “limited times”; and (2)
functional product features that do not satisfy the requirements of
patentability should not be accorded monopolistic protections that
are constitutionally reserved for patents.192
If trade dress protection effectively results in extending the life
of a utility patent, the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution193 requires that trade dress law step aside to allow the patent to
fully fall into the public domain, regardless of whether alternative
designs would achieve the same result from a competitive standpoint. However, outside this relatively narrow circumstance, the
need to avoid a conflict with patent law should not require the abandonment of a pro-competitive approach to the doctrine of functionality, including the consideration of alternative designs. If non191
192
193

Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164–65 (1995) (citation omitted).
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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patented forms of trade dress are ineligible for trademark protection due to their functionality, the justification for the application
of the doctrine lies in the preservation of fair competition, rather
than a tenuous or, in some cases, non-existent conflict with patent
law.
The overriding principle that trademark law does not—or at
least should not—extend a patent-like monopoly to the holder of
the trademark should inform all aspects of the functionality doctrine. Precisely because its roots are lodged in the common law of
unfair competition, outside the constitutional grounding of both
patent and copyright laws, trademark law provides a more limited
form of protection that serves to enable free competition and protect consumers, rather than inspire invention and creativity. The
limits of trademark law are key to maintaining the constitutional
balance between trademarks and patents.
a) The Constitutional Limits of Patent Preemption
The Qualitex Court correctly observed that many product features considered “functional” would not satisfy the statutory conditions for patentability.194 In fact, the vast majority of product features that may be considered “functional” trade dress would not
clear the patentability hurdle. As noted above, TrafFix defined a
functional product feature as one that is “essential to the use or
purpose of the article” or “affects the cost or quality of the article.”195 A patented device similarly must be “useful,”196 but it
must satisfy other requirements as well. It must also be “novel”—
that is, the claimed invention must not be “patented, described in a
printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available
to the public” before the patent application is filed.197 The claimed
194

Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164–65.
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 24 (2001) (quoting
Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165).
196
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (providing that patents may be obtained for a “new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof,” provided other statutory requirements are met); see also In re ‘318
Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317, 1324–27 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (analyzing statutory
utility requirement and concluding that it was not met).
197
35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012); see also In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (defining novelty requirement for patentability).
195
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invention also must not have been “obvious” to one of “ordinary
skill in the art” to which the invention pertains, prior to the patent
filing date.198 Finally, the invention must be described in the patent
application, such that one of ordinary skill in the art could make
and use it.199 None of these requirements apply to useful forms of
trade dress that may be deemed functional. Therefore, the range of
product features that may be considered functional trade dress extends far beyond the limits of federal patent protection.
Qualitex identified this difference in scope as a policy consideration justifying the functionality doctrine itself: utilitarian product
features should not be protected under trademark law, because to
do so would confer upon them monopolistic protection that is constitutionally reserved for patents.200 In Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., the Supreme Court embraced an even broader concept of patent preemption, articulating a bright-line rule that would
place all forms of product design outside the reach of trademark
law:
[W]hen an article is unprotected by a patent or a
copyright, state law may not forbid others to copy
that article. To forbid copying would interfere with
the federal policy, found in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the
Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes, of allowing free access to copy whatever the
federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public
domain.201
198

35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). Obviousness is determined based on “(1) the scope and
content of the prior art; (2) the differences between the claims and the prior art; (3) the
level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective considerations of nonobviousness.”
OSRAM Sylvania, Inc. v. Am. Induction Techs., Inc., 701 F.3d 698, 706 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966)).
199
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012); see also SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d
1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (discussing this requirement).
200
Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164–65.
201
376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,
231 (1964) (“An unpatentable article, like an article on which the patent has expired, is in
the public domain and may be made and sold by whoever chooses to do so.”). Professor
Mark McKenna summarized this position as follows:
[F]eatures that are within the subject matter of patent law . . . fall
outside of trademark law’s reach not because of the consequences of
trademark protection for particular competitors, but to preserve the
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The Court specified that, even if a product design was nonfunctional and had acquired secondary meaning, state law could not
forbid copying it, even if consumer confusion was likely to result.202
Twenty-five years later, the Court took a more nuanced view of
the interrelationship between federal patent law and state unfair
competition law in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.203
Although the Court in Bonito Boats recognized that its opinions in
Compco and its companion case, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,
spoke “in absolutist terms” regarding a constitutional right to
copy, it rejected the idea that federal patent law ipso facto
preempted “all state regulation of potentially patentable but unpatented subject matter.”204 Instead the Court favored a “pragmatic
approach” to the preemption issue, noting that “[s]tate law is not
displaced merely because the contract relates to intellectual property which may or may not be patentable; the states are free to regulate the use of such intellectual property in any manner not inconsistent with federal law.”205
In procedural terms, the Court’s reasoning shifted from a broad
notion of field preemption to conflict preemption. Field preemption exists when “the federal interest [in the field] is so dominant
that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of
state laws on the same subject.”206 Conflict preemption exists
when compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, or
where the state law precludes the “accomplishment and execution
broader structure of the intellectual property system. [F]reedom to
copy [is] the background legal rule to which patent law operates as a
carefully circumscribed exception.
Mark P. McKenna, (Dys)functionality, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 823, 834 (2011).
202
Compco, 376 U.S. at 238. The Court noted that, in such cases, state law could require
precautions such as labeling to prevent confusion, but could not prohibit copying itself. Id.
For a discussion of intermediate remedies provided to prevent confusion in the copying of
functional product features, see infra text accompanying notes 302–09.
203
489 U.S. 141 (1989).
204
Id. at 154 (citing Sears, Roebuck, 376 U.S. at 232).
205
Id. at 156 (quoting Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979)).
206
Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 115 (3d Cir. 2010). A federal law may also
expressly preempt a state one when Congress says that it intends to displace state law on a
given issue, in the text of the federal statute itself. See Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated
Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985); Farina, 625 F.3d at 115. The Patent Act does
not include language indicating such an intent.
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of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” as expressed in
the federal statute.207 In Bonito Boats, the court invalidated a Florida state law that prohibited the duplication of boat hull designs on
the grounds that the statute granted rights “similar in scope and
operation to the rights accorded [under federal patent law],” while
exceeding many of its limitations.208 The Florida law undermined
the purpose and objectives of the federal patent scheme. The Court
distinguished the Florida statute from state laws prohibiting unfair
competition and theft of trade secrets, both of which the Court
characterized as peacefully co-existing with federal patent law.209
In each of these decisions—Compco, Sears Roebuck, and Bonito
Boats—the Supreme Court interpreted the scope of federal patent
law preemption, vis-à-vis a conflicting state statute. None of these
cases interpreted the Lanham Act, the federal statute that dominates trademark law today. Moreover, none of these cases directly
207

Farina, 625 F.3d at 115 (citing Hillsborough Cty., 471 U.S. at 713).
Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 158. The Court noted that the Florida law offered boat hull
manufacturers monopolistic protection for their designs for an unlimited number of years,
“without regard to their ornamental or technological merit.” Id. at 158–59; see also id. at
144–45 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 559.94 (1987)).
209
See id. at 155–56 (discussing state trade secret laws); id. at 157–58 (discussing unfair
competition law). The Court had previously upheld state laws prohibiting theft of trade
secrets, rejecting the claim that these laws were preempted by federal patent law. See
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474 (1974). State right of publicity laws
have also raised preemption issues in the context of federal copyright law. Although the
Supreme Court has not addressed this issue, most of the federal courts that have
considered it have similarly found that right of publicity laws are not preempted by the
federal Copyright Act. See, e.g., Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1003–05
(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiff’s right of publicity claim was not preempted by
federal copyright law, on the grounds that the subject matter protected by the respective
statutes (persona versus work of authorship) were dissimilar); Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d
654, 658 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that a “persona does not fall within the subject matter of
copyright—it does not consist of a ‘writing’ of an ‘author’ within the meaning of the
Copyright Clause of the Constitution” (citation omitted)). But see Maloney v. T3Media,
Inc., 853 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that plaintiff’s right-of-publicy claim was
preempted by the Copyright Act). However, commentators have raised concerns about
the intrusion of right of publicity and other state statutes into the realm of copyright law.
See generally Joseph P. Bauer, Addressing the Incoherency of the Preemption Provision of the
Copyright Act of 1976, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1 (2007) (arguing for expanded
preemption of state law claims under the Copyright Act); Jennifer E. Rothman, The Other
Side of Garcia: The Right of Publicity and Copyright Preemption, 39 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 441
(2016); Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 199 (2002).
208
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confronted the scope or interpretation of the functionality doctrine
in trademark law. The significance of the Lanham Act lies in its
source: Both the Patent Act and the Lanham Act are creatures of
Congress. As one commentator has observed: “Although it may be
true that ‘[i]t is the province of patent law, not trademark law, to
encourage invention by granting inventors a monopoly over new
product designs or functions for a limited time,’ it is equally true
that, as a matter of statutory law, there is nothing to prevent Congress from altering this balance.”210 None of these cases answers
the question of whether and to what extent the Constitution—
specifically the Patent and Copyright Clause211—creates a “right to
copy” that overrides congressional attempts to regulate trade dress
via the Lanham Act.
Although Compco and Sears Roebuck cited the Patent and Copyright Clause in finding a broad “right to copy” anything outside
the scope of federal patent and copyright law,212 as discussed
above, the Supreme Court quickly retreated from this bright-line
rule. The Court has noted that, in drafting the Patent Act, Congress defined patentable subject matter to “include anything under
the sun that is made by man.”213 A broad constitutional right to
copy such subject matter—whether or not it is patentable or functional—would render all forms of product design ineligible for protection as trade dress, in direct conflict with the plain language of
the Lanham Act. The Lanham Act broadly defines trademarks to
include any “symbol” or “device” that is used to “identify and
distinguish” the goods of the producer from the goods of others,
and “to indicate the source of the goods.”214 The Supreme Court
210

Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Copying in the Shadow of the Constitution: The Rational Limits
of Trade Dress Protection, 80 MINN. L. REV. 595, 622 (1996) (emphasis added) (quoting
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995)).
211
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
212
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964); Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 228 (1964).
213
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citing legislative history of the
Patent Act); see also Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 154 (noting that “the broadest reading of
[Sears, Roebuck] would prohibit the States from regulating the deceptive simulation of
trade dress or the tortious appropriation of private information” and rejecting that
interpretation).
214
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (defining the term “trademark”); see also id. § 1125(a)
(creating a cause of action for infringement of unregistered marks, including trade dress).
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has held that trade dress, including trade dress in the form of product design, falls within this definition.215 No court has held that the
Lanham Act’s inclusion of trade dress within the definition of a
trademark is unconstitutional.
The question therefore becomes whether and to what extent
the functionality rule embedded in the Lanham Act is constitutionally compelled. The Supreme Court expressly declined to answer
this question in TrafFix, a case that examined the significance of an
expired utility patent in the context of a trade dress infringement
claim filed under the Lanham Act.216 The Court noted that, if a
case arose in which the functionality rule failed to prevent the protection of trade dress that was “the practical equivalent of an expired utility patent,” then “that will be time enough to consider
the matter.”217 Arguably, TrafFix was such a case,218 but the Court
still declined to rule on the issue. Rather, the Court broadly construed the functionality doctrine, rejecting the concept of alternative designs, without elaborating upon the theoretical underpinnings of the rule. However, TrafFix at least implied that if trade
dress protection under the Lanham Act had the practical effect of
extending the life of a utility patent, it would undermine the purpose of the Patent and Copyright Clause.
The Constitution specifies that the lifetime of a patent must be
“limited.”219 Congress has determined that the limit is twenty
years from the date of filing the patent application.220 Trademarks,
on the other hand, have no expiration date. They are valid and enforceable so long as the trademark holder continues to use the mark

215

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000); see also Qualitex,
514 U.S. at 162 (“Since human beings might use as a ‘symbol’ or ‘device’ almost
anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning, this [statutory] language, read literally,
is not restrictive.”).
216
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 35 (2001) (declining to
decide whether the Patent Clause of the Constitution “prohibits the holder of an expired
utility patent from claiming trade dress protection”).
217
Id.
218
Id. at 30 (“In the case before us, the central advance claimed in the expired utility
patents . . . is the dual-spring design; and the dual-spring design is the essential feature of
the trade dress MDI now seeks to establish and to protect.”).
219
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
220
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012).
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and does not abandon it.221 Therefore, it is not surprising that the
Supreme Court has historically been reluctant to allow trade dress
protection to “tack on” to an expired utility patent.222 Doing so
may alter the terms of the “patent bargain” struck by an inventor
who secures a temporary monopoly under the auspices of federal
patent law.223 As the Court explained in Kellogg and Singer:
[O]n the expiration of a patent the monopoly
granted by it ceases to exist, and the right to make
the thing formerly covered by the patent becomes
public property. It is upon this condition that the patent is granted. It follows . . . that on the termination
of the patent there passes to the public the right to
make the machine in the form in which it was constructed during the patent. We may therefore dismiss without further comment the [unfair competition] complaint as to the form in which the defendant made his machines.224
These cases preceded the federalization of trademark law, and,
therefore, they did not need to (and did not) ground their reasoning
in the Constitution. However, a strong case can be made that the
Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution compels this result.225 Once an inventor has accepted the benefit offered under the
221

Under the Lanham Act, the holder of a federally registered trademark may maintain
that registration by filing a renewal application (attesting to continued use) and paying a
specified fee every ten years. A trademark holder may renew the mark indefinitely so long
as the mark has not been abandoned. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058–1059 (2012). A mark is
considered “abandoned” when its “use has been discontinued with intent not to resume
such use” or when the mark becomes generic or “otherwise lose[s] its significance as a
mark.” Id. § 1127.
222
See Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120 (1938); Singer Mfg. Co. v.
June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896).
223
Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 120 (quoting Singer, 163 U.S. at 185).
224
Id.
225
Courts have been more willing to allow the extension of Lanham Act protection to
material that is or was previously the subject of a federal design patent, as compared to
utility patents. Design patents may be awarded to protect any “new, original and
ornamental design for an article of manufacture.” 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2012). As the Federal
Circuit has noted: “[A] design patent, unlike a utility patent, limits protection to the
ornamental design of the article.” Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1293
(Fed. Cir. 2010). Not unlike trade dress law, design patent protection does not extend to
functional designs. See Hupp v. Siroflex of Am., Inc., 122 F.3d 1456, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
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Constitution and federal patent laws—the grant of a monopoly that
will be protected and enforced for a finite period of time by the federal courts—he must consent to the cessation of that monopoly at
the patent’s expiration. The cost of accepting a monopoly protected by the state is the public dedication of the underlying invention at the end of the monopoly. The expiration of the patent monopoly therefore should obviate the need for competitors to consider alternative designs. In other words, competitors should not
need to “design around” a product configuration that is the subject
of an expired utility patent, even if it has acquired secondary meaning and acts as a source identifier. When a product design feature is
functional for this reason, then alternative designs need not be part
of the equation. However, as discussed later, competitors should
still have a duty to refrain from public deception in the marketing
of these products and may need to take affirmative steps to prevent
consumer confusion, even if the product design is functional.226
Moreover, most functionality cases do not involve a claim of trade
dress protection asserted after the expiration of a utility patent. In
these cases, fair competition, not patent law, should drive the doctrine.

(“A design or shape that is entirely functional, without ornamental or decorative aspect,
does not meet the statutory criteria of a design patent.”). The scope of the functionality
doctrine in the trade dress context, particularly in the post-TrafFix era, is broader than
the functionality doctrine in the context of design patent law. See Peter Lee & Madhavi
Sunder, Design Patents: Law Without Design, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 277, 282–83 (2013).
However, the potential for conflict between the two federal statutes, the Lanham Act and
the Patent Act, is significantly reduced in the context of design patents, as compared to
utility patents, because the protections they afford are not at cross-purposes; if anything,
they are duplicative of each other. More importantly, the constitutional concerns raised
by extending trade dress protections to product features that were previously the subject
of a design patent are simply not as significant as those created by extending trade dress
protection to product features contained within an expired utility patent. Unlike federal
laws protecting utility patents, design patent laws do not go to the heart of the
constitutional admonition to “promote the [p]rogress of . . . useful [a]rts” by protecting,
for limited times, the “[d]iscoveries” of inventors. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Therefore, the two forms of patent protection are not (and should not be) entitled to the
same level of deference, in terms of trademark protection.
226
See infra text accompanying notes 302–09.
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b) Patent Law’s Impact on Functionality with Regard to
Product Features Outside the Scope of Patent Law
Although the TrafFix Court appeared to rule out consideration
of alternative designs from the functionality equation generally, and
not just in cases involving expired utility patents, the Court did not
hold that the Constitution compelled this result.227 For the reasons
discussed below, this Section argues that the broad conception of
functionality articulated in TrafFix, one which focuses on utilitarianism rather than preservation of fair competition, is neither necessary nor effective to police the boundary between patent and
trademark law. The key distinction between the two visions of
functionality is the relevance (or lack thereof) of alternative designs, when the party claiming trade dress protection has not previously sought and obtained patent protection for the relevant
product design or feature.
As discussed above, the Supreme Court articulated but quickly
abandoned the notion that the Patent and Copyright Clause precludes any form of intellectual property protection for subject matter that is not entitled to a patent or a copyright.228 In retreating
from this position, the Court cited trade secret law as an example
of concurrent state and federal protection for subject matter that
may or may not be patentable.229 Trade secret law has been a longstanding alternative to federal patent protection. Congress has tolerated the existence of state trade secret laws for more than one
hundred years and has never indicated that they threaten or are inconsistent with federal patent law.230 Rather, Congress has recently
227

See discussion supra notes 116–21.
See supra notes 201–09 and accompanying text.
229
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 155–56 (1989) (citing
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484–90 (1974)). In describing its decision
in Kewanee, the Court noted that even though “state law protection was available for
ideas which clearly fell within the subject matter of patent,” the “nature and degree of
state protection did not conflict with the federal policies of encouragement of patentable
invention and the prompt disclosure of such innovations.” Id. at 155.
230
Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 493 (“Trade secret law and patent law have co-existed in
this country for over one hundred years.”); see also id. at 494 (Marshall, J., concurring)
(observing that “[s]tate trade secret laws and the federal patent laws have co-existed for
many, many years,” during which “Congress has repeatedly demonstrated its full
awareness of the existence of the trade secret system, without any indication of
disapproval”).
228
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chosen to expand trade secret protections by federalizing trade secret law.231
Many product features or designs that qualify for trade secret
protection would also be considered functional under trademark
law, even if they do not meet the requirements for patentability. In
other words, a product feature that is functional in a utilitarian
sense—one that is “essential to the use or purpose of the article”
or affects its cost or quality232 may also be a trade secret. Rarely
would an “arbitrary flourish”233 be the subject of trade secret protection. If the Constitution precluded all other forms of intellectual
property protection of “functional” subject matter that was not
patentable, trade secret law would surely have to go. Instead, the
Supreme Court has explicitly held that state laws prohibiting theft
of trade secrets do not conflict with, and are not preempted by,
federal patent law.234
231

Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. 114–153, 130 Stat. 376 (codified in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). The Defend Trade Secrets Act was passed by a
unanimous vote in the U.S. Senate and was ratified in the U.S. House of Represenatives
by a vote of 410 to 2. S.1890 – Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/1890/all-actions?overview=
closed&q=%7B%22roll-call-vote%22%3A%22all%22%7D [https://perma.cc/B3QK-53SX]
(last visited Mar. 31, 2017). The federal act essentially codified the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act, a model rule that has been adopted by forty-eight states. David Enzminger,
President Obama Signs Federal Defend Trade Secrets Act, IPWATCHDOG (May 13, 2016),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/05/13/obama-signs-defend-trade-secrets-act/id=
69102/ [https://perma.cc/ZU7Q-GFYX]. Like the Lanham Act, federal jurisdiction for
claims brought under the Defend Trade Secrets Act is based on the Commerce Clause.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1) (2012).
232
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001).
233
Id. at 34 (noting that the relevant design feature was not an “arbitrary flourish” but
instead the “reason the device worked,” therefore rendering it functional).
234
See generally Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. 470. Numerous federal circuits have also held
that the Copyright Act does not preempt claims for misappropriation of a trade secret.
See, e.g., Globeranger Corp. v. Software AG, Inc., 836 F.3d 477, 488 (5th Cir. 2016);
Seng-Tiong Ho v. Taflove, 648 F.3d 489, 503–04 (7th Cir. 2011); Stromback v. New Line
Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 302–05 (6th Cir. 2004); Dunn & Bradstreet Software Servs, Inc. v.
Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 217–18 (3d Cir. 2002); DSC Commc’ns Corp. v.
Pulse Commc’ns Corp., 170 F.3d 1354, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Bateman v. Mnemonics,
Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1549–50 (11th Cir. 1996); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus.,
Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 846–48 (10th Cir. 1993); Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996
F.2d 655, 658–60 (4th Cir. 1993); Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693,
716–21 (2d Cir. 1992); S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1090 n.13 (9th Cir.
1989).
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Moreover, although not all trade secrets meet the requirements
of patentability, many do. Therefore, inventors may choose between these intellectual property regimes (trade secret or patent
law) when seeking to protect their inventions, even if the requirements of patentability are met.235 Whereas patent law offers a guaranteed monopoly for a finite period of time,236 trade secret law,
somewhat like trademark law, offers more limited protection with
no expiration date.237 The majority opinion in Kewanee Oil surmised that inventors would rarely choose trade secret protection
over patent law, because of the superior protections afforded under
the federal patent regime.238 However, as Justice Marshall noted at
the time,239 and as various commentators have argued,240 the
choice of patent law over trade secret law is not a foregone conclu235

Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 491–92 (holding that federal patent law does not preempt
state trade secret laws, even if the underlying subject matter is patentable).
236
The Supreme Court observed:
In consideration of [an invention’s] disclosure and the consequent
benefit to the community, the patent is granted. An exclusive
enjoyment is guaranteed [the inventor] for seventeen years, but upon
expiration of that period, the knowledge of the invention inures to the
people, who are thus enabled without restriction to practice it and
profit by its use.
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) (quoting United
States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186–87 (1933)).
237
See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 489–90 (noting that in many respects trade secret law
provides weaker protections than patent law); 3 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK,
CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 14:15 (4th ed.
2016) (describing key differences between protections afforded under patent and trade
secret law).
238
Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 490 (“The possibility that an inventor who believes his
invention meets the standards of patentability will sit back, rely on trade secret law, and
after one year of use forfeit any right to patent protection [due to disclosure] is remote
indeed.” (citation omitted)).
239
Id. at 493–94 (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that, under some circumstances,
trade secret protections may be “clearly superior to the [seventeen]-year monopoly
afforded by the patent laws”).
240
See, e.g., Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade
Secret Protection: A Legal and Business Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 371,
377 (2002); Andrew A. Schwartz, The Corporate Preference for Trade Secret, 74 OHIO ST.
L.J. 623, 624 (2013) (arguing that corporations should prefer trade secret over patent
protection of intellectual property); Mimi C. Goller, Is A Padlock Better Than A Patent?:
Trade Secrets vs. Patents, 71 WIS. LAW., May 1998, at 20; R. Mark Halligan, Trade Secrets
vs. Patents: The New Calculus, 2 LANDSLIDE, no. 7, July–Aug. 2010, at 10 (discussing
relative merits of trade secret vs. patent protection).
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sion, nor is it a rarity for an inventor to choose trade secret over
patent law (or copyright law) when both are viable options.241 Due
to the emphasis on secrecy in trade secret law (as the name implies), proffering trade secret protection as an alternative to the patent bargain arguably does more to undermine the patent law incentive to invent and disclose242 than trade dress protection does,
especially given that trade dress protection is limited by the functionality doctrine.
In upholding the viability of trade secret law in the face of the
federal patent regime, as noted above, the Supreme Court emphasized the limitations of trade secret protection, in comparison to
the temporary monopoly granted under federal patent law.243 By
contrast, in striking down the Florida law protecting boat hull designs in Bonito Boats, the Court emphasized that the state statute
offered protections that were more, not less, monopolistic than
those available under federal patent law.244 The limitations of
trademark law, which does not simply prohibit the copying of trade
dress, are key to its peaceful coexistence with the Patent and Copyright Clause.
The protection afforded to trade dress under the Lanham Act is
(or should be) more akin to trade secret law than the Florida statute
in Bonito Boats, for two basic reasons. First, trade dress is protectable under trademark law only if it is distinctive—that is, it is acting
as a source identifier for the underlying product.245 Moreover, the
types of trade dress most commonly subjected to a functionality
bar—color and product design—are protectable only with a show-

241

See also GlobeRanger Corp. v. Software AG U.S., Inc., 836 F.3d 477, 483–84 (5th
Cir. 2016) (noting that a creator may choose between the protections of trade secret law
or federal copyright law, depending on whether she more highly values the lack of
disclosure requirements under the trade secret regime or the guaranteed yet limited
monopoly extended under copyright law).
242
See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 494 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“I have no doubt that
the existence of trade secret protection provides in some instances a substantial
disincentive to entrance into the patent system, and thus deprives society of the benefits
of public disclosure of the invention which it is the policy of the patent laws to
encourage.”).
243
Id. 489–90 (majority opinion).
244
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989).
245
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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ing of acquired distinctiveness.246 The requirements of patentability, as described above, do not include a finding of distinctiveness,
either inherent or acquired. Second, and more importantly, trademark protections are not monopolistic in the same manner as patents (and copyrights): trademark rights are not held “in gross.”247
Because proof of trademark infringement requires proof of a likelihood of consumer confusion, not just copying, it does not confer
the same type of monopoly accorded to inventors under patent law.
Nevertheless, many useful (but not patentable) product features
that might otherwise be considered distinctive trade dress are not
protectable under trademark law, as a result of the functionality
doctrine. In this context, however, the driving policy consideration
behind the doctrine is or should be the preservation of fair competition, not a perceived conflict with patent law.
Some recent developments in trademark law have threatened
to undermine its limitations, blurring the distinctions between traditional trademark protection and the monopolies conferred by patents and copyrights.248 The federal trademark dilution statute, in
particular, comes dangerously close to conferring monopolies on
trademark holders, with little to no justification or benefit.249 How246

See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 206 (2000) (holding that
“[d]esign, like color, is not inherently distinctive”).
247
See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (concluding
that a trademark right is not “a right in gross or at large, like a statutory copyright or a
patent for an invention, to either of which, in truth, it has little or no analogy”); see also
Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1800–01 (observing that “a fundamental tenet of
trademark law has always been that, unlike copyrights and patents, trademarks are not
held ‘in gross,’ and therefore the trademark holder’s right to prohibit others’ use of the
mark is limited to circumstances in which that use harms consumers, as determined via
the ‘likelihood of confusion’ standard”).
248
See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1024–
29 (9th Cir. 2004) (reversing district court grant of summary judgment on trademark
infringement claim due to existence of disputed issues of fact regarding initial interest
confusion); Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Ent’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1057–
58 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding likelihood of success on the merits of trademark infringement
claim based on a theory of initial interest confusion); Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts,
944 F.2d 1235, 1245 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding trademark infringement, despite the absence
of consumer confusion at the point of sale, based on a theory of post-sale confusion).
249
See Sandra L. Rierson, The Myth and Reality of Dilution, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.
212, 291 (2012) (observing that “[d]ilution laws come close to granting trademark rights
‘in gross’”). The article argued that the benefits of dilution law are outweighed by the
costs that it imposes on consumers and competitors. Id. at 212–304.
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ever, federal trademark dilution law applies only to “famous”
marks.250 Trade dress in the form of product design is considered a
weak form of trademark,251 and therefore rarely if ever should be
entitled to protection under federal trademark dilution law.252
Therefore, in practice, trademark dilution law should have a minimal impact on the doctrine of functionality, given its general inapplicability to forms of trade dress that could be deemed functional.
The final reason for relying on competition policy, rather than
patent law incentives, to define the boundaries of functionality is a
practical one. If the core purpose of the trademark functionality
doctrine is to police the boundary between patent and trademark
law (even in cases involving non-patentable subject matter), then it
should be more clearly linked to the contours of the patentability
determination rather than vague notions of utility. Many types of
trade dress deemed functional under Inwood’s two-part test appear
to have little if any connection to the concept of patentability. The
color blue, for example, was deemed functional when applied to a
surgical probe because of its visibility during surgical procedures.253
It is difficult to see how the constitutional purpose of spurring innovation and disclosure of invention is aided by denying trade dress
protection to the maker of a distinctive blue surgical probe, when
the benefits conferred by the color blue could just as easily have
been achieved through the use of alternative colors.

250

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2012).
See Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 213 (2000) (noting that “[c]onsumers are aware . . .
that, almost invariably, even the most unusual of product designs . . . is intended not to
identify the source, but to render the product itself more useful or more appealing”).
252
See Rierson, supra note 249, at 298–300, 307–08 (arguing that dilution law is
particularly inappropriate as applied to trade dress infringement claims, and that the
federal dilution statute should be amended to eliminate trade dress dilution claims); see
also Robert G. Bone, A Skeptical View of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, 11 INTELL.
PROP. L. BULL. 187, 196–98 (2007) (criticizing the Trademark Dilution Revision Act for
extending dilution protection to trade dress); Paul Heald, Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. The
West Bend Co.: Exposing the Malign Application of the Federal Dilution Statute to Protect
Product Configuration, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 415, 423–24 (1998) (arguing that the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act should not be construed to apply to trade dress).
253
See ERBE Elektromedizin GmbH v. Canady Tech. LLC, 629 F.3d 1278, 1289 (Fed.
Cir. 2010).
251
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3. Functionality and Alternative Designs
As described above, a competitor’s access to alternative designs, enabling it to effectively compete without creating a likelihood of confusion with the plaintiff’s trade dress, was for many
years a central focus in functionality analysis.254 However, the Supreme Court’s decision in TrafFix has, at a minimum, called into
question the relevance of alternative designs in the functionality
doctrine. According to most circuits, TrafFix held that alternative
designs are irrelevant to the functionality equation, except in cases
of aesthetic functionality.255 By removing this piece of the functionality equation in all cases—not just those that implicate a direct
conflict with patent law—the Court has unnecessarily broadened
the doctrine and hindered its ability to enhance free and fair competition.
In comparing word marks and trade dress, Professor Graeme
Dinwoodie argued that the exclusionary effect of trademark protection in words, measured in competitive terms, is slight compared to
the potential exclusionary effect of extending trademark protection
to aspects of product design.256 Professor Dinwoodie explained:
“[I]t is easy to adopt an alternative label for a competing product;
the part of the lexical commons that is appropriated by the first
producer is very small.”257 By comparison, “the supply of shapes
by which to design a particular product is more confined.”258 However, the relative availability of competitively acceptable alternatives—be they words or forms of trade dress—is a fact-intensive
inquiry that should be examined in each individual case.
Whether a host of competitive alternatives (or none) exists varies from case to case, regardless of whether the source identifier at
issue is in the form of a word or trade dress. As described above,
the genericism doctrine comes into play, particularly in cases of
genericide, because there is no competitively acceptable alternative
to the trademarked word.259 Of course there would be, in theory, a
254
255
256
257
258
259

See supra notes 91–102 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text.
Dinwoodie, supra note 62, at 632–37.
Id. at 634.
Id. at 637.
See supra notes 176–90 and accompanying text.
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host of words that the competitor could adopt as his own trademark, but they would not have any significance in the mind of the
consumer. For example, if Bayer’s competitor had called its drug
the fanciful name Zinga, it would not have been sued for infringing
the Aspirin trademark. However, it also would have been at a distinct competitive disadvantage, because consumers would not have
known what “Zinga” was. In the Qualitex case, by contrast, the
court noted that competitors could choose among a host of alternative colors for their dry-cleaning pads, all of which would serve the
utilitarian purpose of hiding stains.260 Even though the plaintiff’s
specific color (green-gold) was in some sense utilitarian, it was not
functional because there were several competitively equivalent
substitutes.261
In the functionality context, when the extension of trade dress
protection would not effectively extend the life of an expired utility
patent, the court should examine (1) whether any alternatives to
the plaintiff’s trade dress exist that would not negatively impact the
cost or the quality of the product, and (2) whether forcing the defendant to choose one of those alternatives would have a negative
competitive effect. In some contexts, as Professor Dinwoodie observed, the range of alternatives will be limited or perhaps nonexistent.262 In others, however, they may be plentiful.
Eliminating the courts’ ability to perform this analysis yields
limited benefits and may impose significant costs. Restricting the
functionality doctrine to the narrow question of whether a product
feature is utilitarian is not necessary to avoid a conflict with patent
law because, as explained above, the rule is over-inclusive.263 Nor is
such a rule warranted by the policy of preserving free competition.
Sometimes choosing a substitute for plaintiff’s distinctive trade
dress is competitively costly to the defendant; sometimes it is not.
Allowing a defendant to copy the plaintiff’s distinctive trade dress
with no consideration as to whether it is competitively necessary to
do so, when a likelihood of confusion may result, may undermine
rather than foster fair competition.
260
261
262
263

Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prod. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995).
Id.
Dinwoodie, supra note 62, at 637.
See supra notes 228–53 and accompanying text.
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C. The Genericism and Functionality Doctrines Should Not Enable
Free Riding and Consumer Confusion
As noted above, the doctrines of genericism and functionality
both derive from the common-law tort of unfair competition.264
The doctrines seek to limit the scope of trademark protection so
that it does not unfairly limit the ability to compete. Logically,
when the doctrines have the opposite effect—when the generic or
functional label enables rather than prevents unfair competition—
courts should be able and willing to take steps designed to prevent
that result. Consumer confusion imposes costs on consumers and
trademark holders alike, and therefore all aspects of trademark law
should seek to prevent it.265
Aspects of both the genericism and functionality doctrines, particularly in more recent cases, tolerate consumer confusion (or the
potential for it) to varying degrees. For example, modern decisions
interpreting the doctrine of functionality have largely abandoned
unfair competition protections for designs or product features
deemed functional. As to generic words or phrases, the “once generic always generic” mantra also results in the failure to protect
words that have acquired (or reacquired) secondary meaning. As a
result of both policies, consumers may be confused and trademark
holders may be harmed.
1. Genericism and the Problem of Trademark Incapacity or
De Facto Secondary Meaning
The doctrine of trademark incapacity,266 or “de facto secondary meaning,”267 presents itself in two aspects of the genericism
264

See supra Sections I.A–I.B.
See Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099,
2124 (2004) (noting that, when consumer confusion results, the cost of a “false negative
error”—failure to extend trademark protection when it is due—is more costly than a
“false positive error,” i.e., extending trademark protection when it is not warranted);
Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1798–99 (explaining search cost rationale for trademark
protection); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory
or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L. J. 461, 482 (2005) (explaining how trademark infringement
increases consumer search costs).
266
Altman & Pollock, supra note 237, § 20:33; Jake Linford, A Linguistic Justification for
Protecting ‘Generic’ Trademarks, 17 YALE J. L. & TECH. 110, 113–14 (2015) (defining
trademark incapacity as a doctrine under which “courts dismiss evidence that consumers
265
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doctrine. First, numerous courts have held that, once a name or
term has been deemed generic (either formally, by a court, or informally, in a dictionary), it can never function as a trademark,
even if it subsequently acquires distinctiveness in the minds of consumers.268 Second, in determining the trademark significance of a
word in the first instance, courts that have placed a word or term in
the generic category will often ignore or refuse to consider evidence suggesting that its primary significance is that of a source
identifier (the traditional definition of a trademark).269 Such cases
beg the question of how a word or term can truly be generic if evidence suggests that the primary significance of the term is that of a
source identifier in the commercial marketplace. Some degree of
consumer confusion is bound to result when courts decline to pro-

perceive a [generic] term as source-identifying” on grounds that such secondary meaning
is “legally insignificant”).
267
Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1831 (noting that “‘de facto’ secondary
meaning . . . is the legal equivalent of no secondary meaning”).
268
See, e.g., Harley Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 810–12 (2d Cir. 1999)
(“No manufacturer can take out of the language a word . . . that has generic meaning as to
a category of products and appropriate it for its own trademark use . . . .” (citations
omitted)); Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 375–76 (1st Cir. 1980) (“No
amount of purported proof that a generic term has acquired a secondary meaning
associating it with a particular producer can transform that term into a registrable
trademark.” (citations omitted)). In his treatise, McCarthy wrote that “[o]nly in an
extraordinarily rare case could a name once recognized in the past as a generic name be
raised from the public domain to become a trademark by a change in consumer usage over
a significant period of time.” 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 63, § 12:11. Under McCarthy’s
reasoning, only old terms that are “generally unknown in current usage” would be subject
to reappropriation as a trademark. Id.
269
See, e.g., Blinded Veterans Ass’n v. Blinded Am. Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035,
1045 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“A generic term that acquires de facto secondary meaning is
still not afforded trademark protection.” (citing 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 63, at § 12:15));
Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 924 n.4 (10th Cir. 1986)
(“Trademarks that have become generic are subject to cancellation even if they have
acquired a secondary meaning.”); Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Med. Dental Surgeries,
Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1014 (9th Cir. 1979) (noting that a generic term “cannot become a
trademark under any circumstances”); Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co.,
561 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1977) (“[E]ven proof of secondary meaning . . . cannot transform
a generic term into a subject for trademark.”); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting
World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that secondary meaning cannot save a
generic term); CES Publ’g Corp. v. St. Regis Publ’ns, Inc., 531 F.2d 11, 15 (2d Cir. 1975)
(stating that “merely descriptive” terms can be “rescued as trademarks” via proof of
secondary meaning, but generic terms cannot).
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tect words or phrases as trademarks when, as a practical matter,
they are functioning in that capacity.270
a) The Pitfalls of “[L]inguistic [G]rave-[D]igging”271
The “once generic, always generic” doctrine holds that, if a
word has functioned in the lexicon as a generic term at any point in
time, the word can never be protected as a trademark, even if its
meaning has evolved such that few people are even aware of its generic meaning. In linguistic terms, the law ignores the reality of
“semantic shift,” the process by which words change in meaning.272 More accurately stated, the law recognizes semantic shift in
only one direction: the shift that occurs when a trademark loses its
source-identifying significance and becomes a generic term, commonly known as genericide.273 However, when a word evolves in
the opposite direction—a semantic shift known as “restriction”274—the law typically provides no protection for the relevant
word or term, even when consumers perceive it as a source identifier.
For example, the Second Circuit declined to extend protection
to the term “Hog” as applied to a motorcycle manufactured by
Harley Davidson, despite evidence that it was functioning as a

270
Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1833 (noting that “[i]f the ‘primary significance’ of
a term in the commercial context is that of a source identifier, consumers generally do not
benefit when competitors are allowed to use the word generically”).
271
Professor Jake Linford referred to the process by which courts rely on outdated
meanings of terms in dictionaries and similar sources as “linguistic grave-digging.”
Linford, supra note 266, at 146. Similarly, trademark attorney Jerre Swann referred to this
phenomenon as “generic bones in . . . the closet.” Swann, supra note 169, at 654.
272
Linford, supra note 266, at 113 (defining semantic shift); see also Desai & Rierson,
supra note 6, at 1839 (discussing the phenomenon of “hybrid” trademarks and noting that
“[d]espite trademark holders’ best efforts to the contrary, a trademark is much like any
other word, and therefore its meaning and use—depending on the context—will evolve
over time”).
273
See Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1821–22 (describing the process of genericide);
see also Linford, supra note 266, at 149–50 (describing and redefining the doctrine as
“generislide”).
274
Linford, supra note 266, at 115 (explaining that “restriction” occurs when a word
“undergoes a shift in meaning from a broad designator for all members within a category
to a prototypical member of the category”).
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mark.275 In doing so, the court relied on evidence of “generic” use
of the term in dictionaries and in the media for decades preceding
the word’s evolution as a mark.276 The Second Circuit reasoned
that “[t]he public has no more right than a manufacturer to withdraw from the language a generic term, already applicable to the
relevant category of products, and accord it trademark significance,
at least as long as the term retains some generic meaning.”277
The courts’ refusal to recognize the evolution of the lexicon (or
“semantic shift”) elevates form over substance. If the public can
divest a word of its trademark significance by transforming it into a
generic word (via the process of genericide), then it should also be
able to invest a term previously considered generic with acquired
distinctiveness.278 Like the tides, the meaning of language both
ebbs and flows. However, as noted above, courts have been reluctant or unwilling to recognize that “[l]iving languages are not static,”279 at least when assessing the trademark significance of previously generic words.
Although courts in a limited number of cases have allowed
words previously considered generic to function as trademarks, the
courts have done so only under a narrow set of circumstances,280
typically when the generic meaning of the words has been all but
obliterated.281 As some commentators have argued, courts should
275

Harley Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 810–12 (2d Cir. 1999); see also
Linford, supra note 266, at 141 (citing use of the term “Hog” in Harley Davidson as an
example of restriction).
276
Harley Davidson, 164 F.3d. at 810–11 & n.8.
277
Id. at 812.
278
See Swann, supra note 169, at 653 (arguing for a genericism doctrine that would give
“full reign to the dynamics of language”).
279
Linford, supra note 266, at 131.
280
Courts have been slightly more willing to accord protection to generic words that
once functioned as trademarks, fell victim to genericide, and then reacquired sourceidentifying significance. See, e.g., Singer Mfg. Co. v. Briley, 207 F.2d 519, 520 & n.3 (5th
Cir. 1953) (holding that Singer could function as a trademark for sewing machines,
because the company had “recaptured [the name] from the public domain”); Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. v. H. Rosenthal Co., 246 F. Supp. 724, 729 (D. Minn. 1965) (holding
that Goodyear Rubber was a valid trademark, with proof of secondary meaning, despite
prior finding of genericness); see also Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1832 (discussing
cases).
281
See, e.g., Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 655 F.2d 5, 8 n.2 (1st Cir.
1981) (“Where a generic association of a word or term has become obsolete and is
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apply the primary significance test to determine whether a word or
term is functioning as a trademark in the collective mind of the
consuming public, regardless of whether the word, at some previous point in time, would have been considered generic.282 Currently, they do not.283
The Lanham Act does not bar courts from extending trademark
protection to formerly generic words or terms. Arguably, their failure to do so violates the plain language of the Act.284 The Lanham
Act provides only one definition of “generic” terms that are not
subject to protection: “The primary significance of the registered
mark to the relevant public . . . shall be the test for determining
whether the registered mark has become the generic name of goods
or services on or in connection with which it has been used.”285
Although this provision specifically relates to mark cancellation,
the text does not suggest a different definition of “generic” in the
discoverable only by resort to historical sources or dictionaries compiled on historical
principles to preserve from oblivion obsolete words, then, from the viewpoint of
trademark and like law, the word or term is no longer a generic word.”). One
commentator has characterized this standard as “so high as to be practically
insurmountable.” See Peter J. Brody, Comment, Reprotection for Formerly Generic Words,
82 U. CHI. L. REV. 475, 491 (2015).
282
See Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1832–33 (arguing that competitors should not
be allowed to use a word generically if “the ‘primary significance’ of a term in the
commercial context is that of a source identifier”); Linford, supra note 266, at 162–66
(arguing that courts should apply the primary significance test to determine whether
formerly generic words have attained trademark significance); Brody, supra note 281, at
508 (concluding that the primary significance test embodied in the Lanham Act should be
used as the test to determine whether a word or term should be considered generic “in all
instances”); cf. ALTMAN & POLLACK, supra note 266, § 20:33 (arguing that previously
generic words should be protected as marks if there has been a “complete
transformation” of their meaning).
283
See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows.com, Inc., No. 01-CV 02115-ORD, 2004 WL
329250, at *2 (W.D. Wash., Feb. 10, 2004) (refusing to instruct the jury that, “even if
[Microsoft’s Windowns trademark] were generic prior to November 1985, the trademark
would nonetheless be valid today so long as the primary significance of the term today is
not generic”).
284
The Second Circuit observed: “The ‘primary significance test’ is the law of the
land; it was adopted by the Supreme Court in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., and
subsequently codified by Congress in the Trademark Clarification Act of 1984.” Genesee
Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
285
15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2012). This section of the Lanham Act relates specifically to
mark cancellation on the grounds that the mark has become generic. No alternative
definition of “generic” appears elsewhere in the Act.
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context of mark registration or in terms of protecting unregistered
trademarks. For the policy reasons stated above and as a matter of
statutory interpretation, the primary significance of a putative mark
in the commercial marketplace, not its etymological history, should
determine whether it is eligible for trademark protection.
b) Rethinking De Facto Secondary Meaning
Another context in which the genericism doctrine currently declines to extend protection to putative marks, under circumstances
that could lead to a likelihood of confusion, relates specifically to
the use of marks that fall close to the line demarcating the boundary between generic and descriptive. These marks are perhaps
best characterized as “highly descriptive,” because, on their face,
they look like descriptive word marks: They “convey [an] immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the
goods.”286 Examples of highly descriptive terms found to be generic include Surgicenters,287 Lite Beer,288 Filipino Yellow Pages,289
and Diet Chocolate Fudge Soda.290 In all of these cases, courts
have found that the seemingly descriptive name referred to a product genus/class of goods rather than a species/particular product.
As explained by the court in A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman,
“some terms so directly signify the nature of the product that interests of competition demand that other producers be able to use
them even if terms have or might become identified with a
source . . . .”291 In other words, “[c]ourts refuse to protect a generic term because competitors need it more to describe their goods
than the claimed [mark holder] needs it to distinguish its goods
from others.”292 Of course, competitors could choose an inherently
distinctive mark to denote their own products, but courts have fo286

Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976).
Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Med. Dental Surgeries, Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1014 (9th
Cir. 1979).
288
See Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc., 561 F.2d 75, 80 (7th Cir.
1977) (finding “Lite Beer” to be generic).
289
Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publ’ns, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th
Cir. 1999).
290
A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 297 (3d Cir. 1986).
291
Id. at 304.
292
Id.
287
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cused on their need to use the putative mark for its descriptive
properties.
As the court recognized in Canfield, denying protection to
marks that have acquired distinctiveness imposes costs on consumers and on the trademark holder.293 It is unclear why it is necessary
to use the blunt instrument of genericism in this context to preserve competitors’ ability to “describe their goods.”294 That is, of
course, the primary purpose of the fair use doctrine.295 Presumably,
a competitor can describe his goods using the same or similar
words as a descriptive trademark without committing trademark
infringement, even if there are few other words available to describe the relevant goods. The claim of infringement would be viable only if the competitor chose to use the same descriptive/generic name as its own trademark. To the extent the fair use
doctrine is not broad enough to allow for robust competition in this
regard, a better solution may be to expand the scope of fair use rather than declare the relevant mark generic. At a minimum, as discussed below, marks that fall into this category should receive some
degree of protection from unfair competition and passing off, even
if deemed generic.296
2. Courts Should Prevent Unfair Competition Even If
Trademarks Are Deemed Functional or Generic
As previously discussed, under the common law and under the
Lanham Act, generic words or phrases and functional product features or designs are not entitled to protection as trademarks. However, common law courts nonetheless ordered defendants to take
steps to ensure that a competitor’s use of generic words or phrases
and/or functional product features did not result in deliberate passing off or even unintentional consumer confusion. Unfortunately,
this common-law tradition has somewhat faded in the context of
generic words, and all but disappeared in the functionality context.
293

Id. at 308; see also Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1830 (“When secondary meaning
is established and the putative mark is functioning as a source-identifier, confusion and
inefficiency may result when the mark is deemed ‘generic’ and free for all to use.”).
294
A.J. Canfield Co., 808 F.2d at 304.
295
See Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d
1025, 1041–43 (9th Cir. 2010) (defining and applying descriptive fair use doctrine).
296
See infra notes 297–309 and accompanying text.
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These cases should not be controversial. A court dispensing equitable remedies (which are typical in trademark infringement cases)
should shape such remedies in a manner sufficient to prevent the
consumer fraud and unfair competition that may result when words
or product features have acquired distinctiveness, but nonetheless
cannot be protected from trademark infringement as a result of the
genericism or functionality doctrine.
a) Intermediate Protection for Generic Words
Some of the most well-known cases illustrating genericide provided some form of relief to the plaintiff/trademark holder despite
deeming the mark at issue generic. For example, in the Supreme
Court’s analysis of the name “Shredded Wheat” as applied to cereal, the Court held that, although the name did not deserve protection as a trademark because it had become generic, the defendant nevertheless had a duty to use “reasonable care to inform the
public of the source of its product.”297 In this case, the Court found
that defendant Kellogg Company’s use of a distinctive label and
carton was sufficient to demonstrate that it was “fairly” using the
Shredded Wheat name.298 Many courts have shaped injunctive relief in genericide cases to limit a competitor’s ability to use a generic word or term when necessary to prevent consumer confusion
and thereby ensure fair competition.299 Although many of these
297
Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118–19 (1938). The Court noted that,
even though the “Shredded Wheat” brand had been deemed generic, “[t]he question
remains whether Kellogg Company in exercising its right to use the name ‘Shredded
Wheat’ and the pillow-shaped biscuit, is doing so fairly. Fairness requires that it be done
in a manner which reasonably distinguishes its product from that of plaintiff.” Id. at 120;
see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 735(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1938).
298
Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 120–21 (noting that the Kellogg cartons “do not resemble those
used by the plaintiff either in size, form, or color,” and that the “difference in the labels is
striking”).
299
See, e.g., Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 203–04 (1896) (holding
that, even though the word “Singer” had “become public property, and the defendant
had a right to use it,” defendant was enjoined from using the word “Singer” on any of its
machines or in any of its advertisements “without clearly and unmistakably stating . . .
that the machines [were] made by the defendant,” and therefore were not the product of
the Singer Manufacturing Company); King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc.,
321 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1963) (affirming district court order that, although the word
“thermos” was deemed generic, plaintiff’s competitor “must invariably precede the use
of the word ‘thermos’ by the possessive of the name ‘Aladdin’; . . . [c]onfine its use of
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cases precede the passage of the 1946 Lanham Act and resulting
federalization of trademark law, some more recent cases have also
imposed such restrictions or recognized the defendant’s duty to do
so.300
Fewer cases have imposed restrictions on defendants, vis-à-vis
the use of generic words that have acquired so-called de facto secondary meaning, if those words did not start their linguistic life
cycle as a valid trademark.301 In other words, courts have been
more willing to extend such protections when the word or term is
deemed unprotectable due to genericide, rather than an initial determination that the word is generic. The reason for this distinction
is unclear. The potential for likelihood of consumer confusion and
its attendant economic costs exists regardless of whether the word
or term in question was once recognized as a trademark. The purpose of providing limited forms of relief in these types of cases is
not to provide a consolation prize to disappointed trademark holders whose marks were once distinctive and valuable. The point is to
avoid consumer confusion and the costs that it imposes on consumers and competitors alike. If that is the goal, then the original
status of the relevant mark should be irrelevant in making this determination.

‘thermos’ to the lower-case ‘t’; and . . . never use the words ‘original’ or ‘genuine’ in
describing its product,” to “eliminate confusion and the possibility of deceit”); DuPont
Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 1936) (noting that defendant
should identify its product as “Sylvania cellophane” when filling orders or in
advertisements, “in the interest of justice”).
300
See, e.g., Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 102 (2d Cir.
1989) (finding the term “murphy bed” to be generic but enjoining defendant’s “passing
off” of his product as “original” Murphy Beds by the “Murphy Bed Co. of America”
under the doctrine of unfair competition).
301
Swann, supra note 169, at 646 (observing that “the limited protection that may be
afforded dual use terms to protect their trademark significance is not available when a
mark starts out generic” (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted)). But see
Blinded Veterans Ass’n v. Blinded Am. Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035, 1047 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (finding the term “Blinded American Veteran’s Association” generic, but
remanding case for further findings regarding consumer confusion and suggesting that, if
evidence of “passing off” existed, a disclaimer could be required).
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b) Preventing Confusion in the Copying of Functional
Designs
Common law applications of the functionality doctrine, like the
early decisions in the genericism/genericide context, recognized
functionality as part of the broader law of unfair competition and
therefore imposed limitations on the use of “functional” product
features when necessary to prevent consumer confusion and passing off.302 Under the Lanham Act and the case law interpreting it,
however, a court may refuse to consider evidence of secondary
meaning, once a product feature is deemed functional.303 This formalistic approach to functionality effectively precludes more limited forms of protection (such as labels or disclaimers designed to
prevent consumer deception), which should otherwise be available
under a common law claim for unfair competition, even if a distinctive product feature does not qualify for protection as a trademark.
Commentators have criticized this shift by the courts as injurious
to both consumers and competitors alike.304
The functionality doctrine’s absolute nature—particularly
when combined with its ambiguities and breadth of scope under the
Supreme Court’s decision in TrafFix—can create unfair competition and harm consumers. For example, in ERBE Elektromedizin
GmbH v. Canady Technology LLC, the Federal Circuit found that
the maker of blue endoscopic surgical probes had failed to carry its
burden of proof in establishing the non-functionality of the blue
302

See supra notes 75–76, 85 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
TORTS § 741(b)(ii) (AM. LAW INST. 1938) (providing that distinctive product features that
are functional should not be copies without taking “reasonable steps to inform
prospective purchasers that the goods which [defendant] markets are not those of the
[plaintiff]”); § 741 cmt. j (“If an imitated feature is functional but has also acquired
generally in the market a special significance as an indication of the source of the goods,
the imitation is privileged if it is accompanied by reasonable effort to avoid deceiving
prospective purchasers as to the source.”).
303
See, e.g., TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001) (noting
that, because the Court had found the relevant product feature to be functional, whether
it had acquired secondary meaning “need not be considered”).
304
See Dinwoodie, supra note 62, at 746–51 (arguing in favor of awarding limited forms
of relief to protect functional designs, when evidence of consumer confusion is present);
Thurmon, supra note 58, at 344–46 (critiquing application of the functionality doctrine as
a complete bar to trademark protection in cases where consumer confusion would likely
result).
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color of the probes, noting that plaintiff had failed to “present a
genuine issue of material fact that the color blue does not make the
probe more visible through an endoscopic camera or that such a
color mark would not lead to anti-competitive effects.”305 The
court rejected plaintiff’s evidence that other colors (anything other
than beige or red) would have been clearly visible during endoscopic procedures.306 As a result, the court granted summary judgment
to the defendant and allowed it to continue copying the blue color
and black markings of plaintiff’s endoscopic probes.307
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Newman noted
that the defendant had admitted to deliberately copying the plaintiff’s trade dress, in the form of the blue color and black markings
on the probes.308 Defendant’s deliberate copying, combined with
what Judge Newman believed to be “evidence of likelihood of confusion as to the source and identity of the probe,” combined to
pose a threat to the public interest, particularly given that the relevant product was used in the surgical field.309 The possibility of
consumer deception posed by this case could have been ameliorated by either (1) more narrowly construing the doctrine of functionality to prevent defendant’s copying of plaintiff’s trade dress in
the first instance, or (2) imposing equitable limitations on the defendant to restrict its ability to dress up its surgical probes as those
of the plaintiff, such as disclaimers in advertising, labeling, or packaging. The court’s refusal to extend any form of protection to the
plaintiff’s trade dress increased the likelihood of consumer deception and competitive injury to the original manufacturer.

305

629 F.3d 1278, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also id. at 1288 (noting that “[c]olor may
not be granted trademark protection if the color performs a utilitarian function in
connection with the goods it identifies or there are specific competitive advantages for
use”). The Federal Circuit heard this case because the trademark functionality issue was
decided concurrently with a patent infringement claim, over which the Federal Circuit
had exclusive jurisdiction.
306
Id. at 1289.
307
Id. at 1291.
308
Id. at 1293 (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
309
Id. Judge Newman observed that “[t]he public interest in avoidance of deception or
confusion looms particularly large in the medical/surgical field, where the surgeon’s
experience of quality and performance, on recognition of the surgical device by its unique
color, is a matter of public concern.” Id.

760

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVII:691

CONCLUSION
The doctrines of trademark genericism and functionality
emerged from the common law of unfair competition, as courts
recognized that expanding trademark protections could have the
unintentional effect of impairing competition or illegitimately expanding upon a party’s patent monopoly. However, in keeping
with their overriding goal of suppressing free riding and consumer
fraud, the courts consistently maintained a duty on the part of defendants to refrain from using source-identifying words or product
features in ways that resulted in consumer deception and loss of
goodwill. This flexible common-law approach has been supplanted
by more rigid doctrinal rules that attempt to draw brighter lines between generic or functional subject matter and registrable trademarks. Although bright-line rules have the supposed benefit of eliminating ambiguity and its attendant transaction costs, in many
ways these more rigid rules have had the opposite effect. The codification of the genericism and functionality doctrines in the Lanham Act, and the heightened importance of trademark registration
under the Act, has enhanced the significance of the doctrines and
therefore magnified the potential harm imposed by unpredictable
rules that may elevate form over substance.
Repurposing the genericism and functionality doctrines toward
their original underlying principle would benefit trademark holders
and consumers alike. Unlike more controversial areas of trademark
law, such as the federal trademark dilution statute, expansion or
clarification of trademark rights in this context would not restrict
competition at the expense of consumers or endanger free speech.
When defining the boundaries of trademark law—which the genericism and functionality doctrines are designed to do—courts
should adopt a pragmatic approach that embraces and reflects the
common-law roots of trademark law itself: the preservation of free
and fair competition.

